APPENDIX H 
Provisional Statement of the Conference Proceedings 
1. This meeting was organized to review scientific progress in the area 
of recombinant DNA molecules and to discuss appropriate ways to deal with 
the potential biohazards of this work. We have heard about the enormous 
scientific progress already achieved in this field, and have seen glimpses 
of the remarkable potential of these methods to accelerate the rate at 
which we may gain understanding of the fundamental processes occurring 
in eukaryotic cells. The use of recombinant DNA methodology promises 
to revolutionize the practice of molecular biology. While there has as yet 
been no practical application of the new techniques, there is every reason 
to believe that it v/ill have significant impact in the future. 
The participants at the meeting agreed that the pause in research, 
called for in the July 1974 committee letter, ought not to be left unresolved. 
They considered whether there were ways in which the scientific work could 
be undertaken with minimal risks to the workers in laboratories and to 
society at large. It v/as emphasized that, in the longer term, even more 
difficult problems may arise in the probably large scale applications of this 
work in industry, medicine and agriculture. Even in the currently more 
limited area of the conduct of research in this field, the evaluation of potential 
biohazards has proved to be extremely difficult. The new techniques com- 
bining genetic information from very different organisms place us in an 
area of biology with many unknowns. It is this ignorance that has compelled 
us to conclude that it would be wise to exercise the utmost caution. Never- 
theless, the work should proceed but with appropriate safeguards. Although 
future experience may dispel many fears, standards of protection should be 
- set high at the beginning and each escalation, however small, should be 
carefully assessed. 
2. Though our assessments of the risks involved with each of the various 
lines of research on recombinant DNA molecules may differ, few, if any, 
believe that this methodology is free of any risk. Reasonable principles for 
dealing with these risks are to adopt containment as a part of the experimental 
strategy and that the effectiveness of the containment should match the risk. 
Whatever scale of risks is ultimately devised, we shall need a commensurate 
scale of containment. Consequently we must seek means for estimating the 
risks, perhaps subjectively at first but objectively as we acquire additional 
knowledge, and then to match that risk to the appropriate degree of containment. 
Experiments requiring large scale operations would seem to be riskier than 
the equivalent experiment done on a small scale, and, therefore, require 
more stringent containment procedures. Improvements in the methodology, 
e. g. , a "disarmed” vector or host cell, could permit a reduction in the con- 
tainment requirement. Quite possibly the ways in which potential biohazards 
and different levels of containment are matched may vary from country to 
country; also, the ways could vary from time to time as the containment 
technology is improved. Thus, it is essential that there be a continued 
reassessment of the balancing of risk against level of containment. 
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