1984 Summary Statement: Berg el al. 
Proc. Nat. Acad. Sci. USA 72 (1975) 
such experiments before they are initiated. Free and open 
discussion is necessary so that each individual participating in 
the experiment fully understands the nature of the experiment 
and any risk that might be involved. All workers must be 
properly trained in the containment procedures that are de- 
signed to control the hazard, including emergency actions in 
the event of a hazard. It is also recommended that appropriate 
health surveillance of all personnel, including serological 
monitoring, be conducted periodically. 
C. Education and reassessment 
Research in this area will develop very quickly and the 
methods will be applied to many different biological problems. 
At any given time it is impossible to foresee the entire range 
of all potential experiments and make judgments on them. 
Therefore, it is essential to undertake a continuing reassess- 
ment of the problems in the light of new scientific knowledge. 
This could be achieved by a series of annual workshops and 
meetings, some of which should be at the international level. 
There should also be courses to train individuals in the 
relevant methods since it is likely that the work will be taken 
up by laboratories which may not have had extensive ex- 
perience in this area. High priority should also be given to 
research that could improve and evaluate the containment 
effectiveness of new and existing vector-host systems. 
V. NEW KNOWLEDGE 
This document represents our first assessment of the potential 
biohazards in the light of current knowledge. However, little 
is known about the survival of laboratory strains of bacteria 
and bacteriophages in different ecological niches in the outside 
world. Even less is known about whether recombinant DNA 
molecules will enhance or depress the survival of their vectors 
and hosts in nature. These questions are fundamental to the 
testing of any new organism that may be constructed. Re- 
search in this area needs to be undertaken and should be given 
high priority. In general, however, molecular biologists who 
may construct DNA recombinant molecules do not undertake 
these experiments and it will be necessary to facilitate col- 
laborative research between them and groups skilled in the 
study of bacterial infection or ecological microbiology. Work 
should also be undertaken which would enable us to monitor 
the escape or dissemination of cloning vehicles and their hosts. 
Nothing is known about the potential infectivity in higher 
organisms of phages or bacteria containing segments of 
eukaryotic DNA and very little about the infectivity of the 
DNA molecules themselves. Genetic transformation of bac- 
teria does occur in animals, suggesting that recombinant 
DNA molecules can retain their biological potency in this 
environment. There are many questions in this area, the 
answers to which are essential for our assessment of the bio- 
hazards of experiments with recombinant DNA molecules. 
It will be necessary to ensure that this work will be planned 
and carried out; and it will be particularly important to have 
this information before large scale applications of the use of 
recombinant DNA molecules is attempted. 
The work of the committee was assisted by the National 
Academy of Sciences-National Research Council Staff: Artemis 
P. Simopoulos (Executive Secretary) and Elena O. Nightingale 
(Resident Fellow), Division of Medical Sciences, Assembly of 
Life Sciences, and supported by the National Institutes of 
Health (Contract NOl-OD-5-2103) and the National Science 
Foundation (Grant GBMS75-05293). 
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