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The advisory committee has included in the proposed guidelines specific 
recommendations concerning implementation in the instance of work supported 
by research grants. 
First, the principal investigator is given extensive responsibilities. 
The principal investigator is most likely to be either the person who is 
doing the experiments or in groups working together, a senior scientist who 
might have under his direction graduate students, post-doctoral fellows, 
technicians and so forth. This individual has the responsibility to assess 
any potential biohazards, to institute appropriate safeguards and proce- 
dures, to minimize the effect of possible accidents by planning, to train 
and inform all personnel, and all of these on a continuing basis. 
Thus, the primary responsibility for conducting experiments according 
to the guidelines is his hands. 
Further, in applying for grants to carry out experiments on recombinant 
DNA, the investigator must include an estimate of the potential biohazards 
as well as a statement as to the containment procedures that will be used. 
Should these procedures include P3 or P4 conditions, the application must 
include certification as to the existence and availability of facilities 
which meet the definitions of P3 or P4 as described in the guidelines. 
Therefore, the guidelines also indicate that institutions in which re- 
combinant DNA experiments are carried out must establish biohazard commit- 
tees which can serve to examine equipment and facilities and to certify 
their compliance with the requirements for P3 and P4 containment. 
Such committees will also serve as a source for advice and reference 
on physical containment facilities, on the properties of biological contain- 
ment systems, and on the training of personnel. 
The guidelines specifically state that it is not the responsibility of 
such committees to determine either the scientific quality of proposed 
experiments or the containment conditions required. 
According to the proposed guidelines, review of the investigator's 
judgment concerning the extent of potential hazard and the required contain- 
ment would be by peer groups during the normal scientific review of the 
application. The guidelines leave flexible the question of resolving any 
differences between the evaluation of the investigator and that of the peer 
group, and presumably this might be done informally through the executive 
secretary of the study section. The guidelines do state, however, that in 
instances where resolution of differences cannot be made the matter should 
be referred to an appropriate committee. 
The proposed guidelines further specify that in those instances where 
plans are made to initiate experiments on recombinant DNA under already 
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