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I believe we should delay this work until the present guidelines are 
altered in at least three basic ways. One, we should not use E. coli , whose 
natural host is man, as the vehicle for cloning. Two, the low classifica- 
tion for shotgun experiments in invertebrates, some pathogenic bacteria, 
and plants because of potential biohazards should be altered. And three, we 
should create effective, board-based agencies for the implementation and 
monitoring of safety procedures recommended in the guidelines. 
Now E. coli is a normal constituent of the human gut and pharynx. Any 
potentially dangerous organism which this technology generates is capable 
of infecting the entire human population. The guidelines provide standards 
which theoretically lower the probability of danger through the use of 
crippled _E. coli and physical containment, but these probabilities are not 
low at all considering the number of bacteria in any one experiment, the 
number of experiments done over the years, the possibilities of uncrippl- 
ing taking place by genetic transfer or reversion, and the known weaknesses 
of using P3 or P4 containment. Therefore, it is unwise to use an organism 
whose ecological niche is human beings, like E. coli . 
Many shotgun experiments or blindly cloning total DNA from inverte- 
brates like insects or pathogenic bacteria carry clear hazards. Here PI or 
P2 containment which represents little more than standard microbiological 
technique, and EK1, or normal _E. coli , are the standards for safety. Yet 
insects carry many known DNA viruses, some similar to those causing tumors 
in vertebrates. Invertebrates also code for hormones with potential activ- 
ity in human systems, for instance, nerve growth factor, as well as enzymes 
whose continued synthesis in the human gut would be disastrous, like 
cellulose-degrading enzymes, thus causing a victim to have no roughage. 
For each of these known potential hazards, there must be others among 
the many as yet undiscovered genes in these organisms. The fact that the 
experiments with these organisms are at present being carried out is fright- 
ening to me. 
As a graduate student I know that we are often socialized into accept- 
ing the poor safety habits of the lab where we work. We can't depend on 
the people who are doing these experiments to check on their own safety con- 
ditions. They have already ignored or accepted the risks involved. But 
those people most likely to be exposed to a risk — technicians, janitors, 
graduate students, and dishwashers — should have a right to protection under 
the Occupational Safety and Health Act. 
Therefore, we recommend that independent safety and inspection commit- 
tees be set up with a broad-based composition representing the interest of 
all people concerned. 
To me there are at present no pressing social benefits to be gained 
from this research. If they are to come at all, what matter if it takes 20 
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