153 
There are some points, three and four, which deal specifically with the 
guidelines, which I think are non-trivial. However, in three minutes I am 
not going to have time to go into those. 
DR. FREDRICKSON: That has been circulated. 
DR. ZIMMERMAN: Okay, thank you, Dr. Fredrickson. 
What I would like to bring up are the first two points on this paper 
which really have not been touched upon. Number one, the thing that 
concerns me is not the legitimate scientific inquiry being done by NIH- 
supported scientists in this audience, but rather those from other sectors 
of the so-called scientific community which are beyond any jurisdiction that 
NIH would have. Particularly, what about drug companies who may have less 
noble motives than the scientists, and if under the pressure to make some 
biological which may have a profit value, they may well, even though they 
have verbally said they would comply with the guidelines, ignore them in the 
heat of competition with their competitors. 
Another thing that concerns me is what about the Department of Defense. 
There is still millions of dollars being appropriated for chemical and bio- 
logical warfare research. Now, while there is a moratorium that has been 
observed by DoD on the development of so-called offensive biological wea- 
pons, must we merely accept that assurance of DoD that this type of experi- 
ment will not be undertaken as our only guarantee for safety? That is, the 
technology now exists for doing downright diabolical genetic engineering 
experiments. Therefore, I wish to raise the question particularly to the 
lawyers present, and perhaps Mr. Hutt would like to comment later on this, 
what legal authority exists for extending these guidelines to all sectors 
of the scientific community, and if not, what can be done on this score? 
The other point which I wish to discuss, the second point, is namely 
assuming that effective guidelines are defined and there is some mechanism 
for extending the guidelines to all scientists, how may they be effectively 
implemented and enforced? 
Now, an analogy might be drawn with the handling of radioactive mate- 
rials, which are supposedly under strict Federal control. Most of us who 
have been working in molecular biology or biochemistry labs have probably 
seen many blatant abuses by people who should know better in the handling 
and disposal of radioactive material. In many cases, technicians and lesser 
personnel are not trained in the proper technique. In many cases even 
senior scientists are not, and when they are, simply choose to ignore those 
standards . 
I think there is an element of human nature that has to be dealt with, 
namely if a hazard can't be seen or felt or smelled, it is much easier to 
ignore than something that smells bad, for example. 
[294] 
