175 
elegantly. You know, we see lots of numbers, again, and they are large 
numbers, and they are impressive, but when you increase the number of labs 
exponentially it should be obvious the effect that has on the probability 
of accidents. Likewise, the same thing would occur with industry. Industry 
is interested in this. ICI in England and General Electric, as I stated in 
this statement, have either shown strong interest in doing the work or are 
already involved in doing it. 
Now, I would like to read from our original critique. "Many biolo- 
gists have worked hard and long to draft the Asilomar statement and Wood's 
Hole guidelines [and also the La Jolla guidelines] . We admire this work 
tremendously and feel it is a very positive development when a community 
of researchers join together planning to eliminate hazards from experi- 
mental design. The initial unprecedented response by scientists to a new 
technology, calling a moratorium and the subsequent Asilomar meeting, and 
saying there are certain things that we are wise enough to refrain from, 
brought public approval on a wide scale. 
"Now, the situation in practice and on paper is in flux. Our own cur- 
rent position is that recombinant DNA experimentation is valuable in se- 
lected instances and hazardous in others. The problems facing the guide- 
lines committee is to choose carefully those few experiments which will 
lead to societal benefit from a collection of innumerable, possible experi- 
ments, many of which will be too hazardous to merit being done. 
"In stating that an experiment creating a new organism is too hazard- 
ous to be done, it bears clear emphasis that there is no issue of freedom 
of inquiry. We fully support freedom of scientific inquiry. However there 
is here an issue of freedom of manufacture - the manufacture, in this case, 
of self-replicating, novel organisms, which are potential global health 
hazards or ecological hazards.... 
"The difficulties of estimating by theoretical considerations the 
potential hazards of DNA recombinant experiments appears insurmountable. A 
comparison might be made to the dangers involved in using radioisotopes in 
biological research. With radioisotopes the direct dangers to lab person- 
nel, dangers of disposal into the water supply or into landfill, etc., can 
be quantified. It is known that exposures to certain levels of radiation 
is dangerous, whereas exposure to certain lower levels is not. It is thus 
possible to say this level of safety (procedure) is adequate while that 
level of safety is inadequate. 
"The situation is fundamentally different in the case of recombinant 
DNA experiments. Here the dangers can not be quantified. They can only be 
guessed at over an extremely broad range of probabilities (from high to low) 
for any single given experiment. It is thus very difficult, and indeed, 
somewhat unrealistic to say this level of safety (procedure) is adequate. 
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