182 
knowing human frailty these vectors will escape, they will get into the 
environment, and there is no way to recapture them. 
The hazard, if there is a hazard, will not be like DDT or PCB or aero- 
sol propellants. In those instances, if one finds there is a hazard, you 
stop the manufacture, and in time at least the hazard will disappear. In 
this case, obviously, that does not apply. I think that has to weight the 
decisions that are taken. I think you have a hard job. 
DR. FREDRICKSON: Dr. Shaw? 
DR. SHAW: Dr. Fredrickson, I think I can summarize my position with 
two statements, one substantive and one procedural. 
DR. FREDRICKSON: Dr. Shaw, I believe you can be recorded, but please 
speak up a little. 
DR. SHAW: All right. 
Substantively, I don't think that our advisory committee can come close 
in a day and a half or even with a 3-week course to come up to a level of 
understanding of the guidelines that have been promulgated by the NIH ad- 
visory committee. I would prefer to leave that issue in the hands of those 
that have worked so diligently over the last year and a half, and have come 
up with four separate working papers. 
To continue, that the guidelines as they were drawn up at Asilomar were 
in effect, that the La Jolla guidelines become in effect, a continuation in 
flexibility, and change of the guidelines, continue with the input of yes- 
terday's and today's statements being carefully weighed by that committee to 
consider the substantive issues of experiments to evaluate the risks, to 
search for alternate organisms, to consider extending, or expanding or con- 
tracting their no-no list of experiments. 
I am primarily concerned, and I think this committee could address 
better the procedural problems of monitoring and enforcement and surveil- 
lance, and I am very concerned about this. There is very little stated in 
the guidelines as to how this would be done. 
One of the statements on the agency being able to review any requested 
changes of a principal investigator unless the agency felt it needed outside 
expertise to make a decision, I think this should be carefully reconsidered 
and should go back to peer review if there are substantive changes in the 
direction of the research. 
I am concerned about the principal investigator's statement of respon- 
sibility. The public biohazards statement, I think, should be made public. 
[323] 
