Dr. Donald S. Fredrickson 
Page Two 
B . Prohibited Experiments 
aj I believe that a prohibition of all experiments which create 
organisms resistant to any antibiotic irrespective of its use in medicine 
or agriculture would have little merit. What danger would it head off?-' 
Why should one want to proscribe experiments involving antibiotics that 
are nearly useless for therapy but provide convenient selective agents 
for certain genetic manipulations? I believe that we should try to limit 
or prevent the creation of a) species of bacteria with antibiotic resistance 
properties not now known to occur or to arise by any natural recombina- 
tion process (conjugation, phage mediated transduction or DNA-mediated 
transformation); and b) species of bacteria with combinations of anti- 
biotic resistance determinants that are not known to occur or arise under 
the conditions mentioned above. With organisms of low or no pathogene- 
city P3 facilities seem adequate. But I would confine experiments in 
which single or combinations of drug resistance determinants are to be 
introduced into pathogenic bacteria to special P4 facilities or if the 
organisms were particularly virulent and dangerous, they should be de- 
ferred for the present. 
Specific questions 
1. I find the use of the words present or future use very confusing. 
How could one anticipate future use of an antibiotic? And who would 
decide if there is to be a possible use of an antibiotic in the future? 
2. I omit comment on paragraph 2 because I think I would accept 
the opinion of people like Falkow, Clowes, Cohen and Novick. My limited 
knowledge, however, says that there are very few antibiotic resistance 
determinants that do not occur or arise naturally in E. coli when the 
appropriate selection is made for them. If EK2 E . c oli are used, then 
there is a very reduced liklihood of such experiments causing difficulty. 
I suspect we should be more worried about putting drug resistance deter- 
minants into organisms other than E. coli inasmuch as there is presently 
no corresponding requirement for biological containment. Such experi- 
ments should be done only in very secure physical containment facilities, 
but perhaps only after the development of suitable biological safeguards. 
3. I assume that what your question asked was whether experi- 
ments with DNA from an organism already (not potentially) infected with 
a Class 3, 4 and 5 pathogenic agent should be prohibited. I believe it 
should. 
[ 513 ] 
A 
