VI[ 
CREATION BY LAW 
145 
occur to Mm as possible. Intention is the one thing which 
he does see, and which, when he does not see, he seeks for 
diligently until he finds it. He exhausts every form of words 
and of illustration, by which intention or mental purpose can 
be described. * Contrivance ’ — ‘curious contrivance/ — ‘beauti- 
ful contrivance/ — these are expressions which occur over and 
over again. Here is one sentence describing the parts of a 
particular species : ‘ The labellum is developed into a long 
nectary, in order to attract Lepidoptera, and we shall presently 
give reason for suspecting that the nectar is purposely so 
lodged that it can be sucked only slowly in order to give time 
for the curious chemical quality of the viscid matter setting 
hard and dry.’ ” Many other examples of similar expressions 
are quoted by the Duke, who maintains that no explanation 
of these “ contrivances ” has been or can be given, except on 
the supposition of a personal contriver, specially arranging 
the details of each case, although causing them to be produced 
by the ordinary processes of growth and reproduction. 
Now there is a difficulty in this view of the origin of the 
structure of Orchids which the Duke does not allude to. The 
majority of flowering plants are fertilised, either without the 
agency of insects or, when insects are required, without any 
very important modification of the structure of the flower. 
It is evident, therefore, that flowers might have been formed 
as varied, fantastic, and beautiful as the orchids, and yet have 
been fertilised without more complexity of structure than is 
found in violets, or clover, or primroses, or a thousand other 
flowers. The strange springs and traps and pitfalls found in 
the flowers of orchids cannot be necessary per se, since exactly 
the same end is gained in ten thousand other flowers which 
do not possess them. Is it not then an extraordinary idea, to 
imagine the Creator of the universe contriving the various 
complicated parts of these flowers, as a mechanic might con- 
trive an ingenious toy or a difficult puzzle ? Is it not a more 
worthy conception that they are some of the results of those 
general laws which were so co-ordinated at the first intro- 
duction of life upon the earth as to result necessarily in the 
utmost possible development of varied forms ? 
But let us take one of the simpler cases adduced and see 
if our general laws are unable to account for it. 
L 
