Chap. HI. of the ENGLISH in AMERICA, 321 
againft Barhadoes or the Leeward IJlands, when they 
“ had an Enemy fo near them ; for they miift needs 
“ confider, if their Men were fent off that Bland to in- 
“ vade the Leeward Ijlandis^ the Barbadians would join 
“ the People of St. Lucia., and fall upon Martinico in the 
“ Abfence of their Men ; which would endanger the 
“ Lofs of that Bland, or at ieaft the Plunder or fpoiling 
“ of it ; and would be more Damage to them than any 
“ Benefit they can propofe to themfelves, by invading 
“ the Leeward IJlands, and fo the fame if their Defign 
“ is againft Barhadoes •, the Leeward IJlands People join- 
“ ing thefe of St. Lucia^ Martinico will be in the fame 
“ Danger, and by that Means our Plantations, in thofe 
“ Parts, will be entirely fecured by the Poffefllon of St. 
“ Lucia^ and it will alfo be in the Power of the Englijh 
“ to difturb the French, and not in the Power of the 
“ French to hurt the Fnglijh. But if both Nations fiiould 
“ fit ftill without hurting each other, yet St. Lucia will 
“ be of the greateft Advantage to Great Britain, if it 
‘‘ were appointed the Place of Rendezvous for his Ma- 
“ jefty’s Ships of War j from whence they might con- 
“ tinually relieve each other, if need were, and keep 
“ always cruizing on the French, that they could not be 
“ able to have a VelTel go in or out of their Harbour, 
“ but what might be intercepted by the King’s Ships, 
“ and fo the Trade of our Plantations would thereby 
“ become fecured, and the Martinicans would have no 
“ Reafon to boaft as they did in the late War, that they 
“ maintained their Hands chiefly by privateering on the 
“ Englijh, which is too well known to the Merchants 
“ that have been Traders to thofe Parts. But in cafe St. 
“ Lucia was fettled, and proper Meafures purfued, it 
“ would entirely prevent fuch Mifchiefs for the future, 
“ and the Engltjh would foon grow too powerful for the 
“ French, who at prefent have greatly the Advantage of 
“ the Englijh •, and the Leeward IJlands are in the greateft 
Danger, in cafe of a War with France, of being inva- 
“ ded, which the Englijh Planters are moft fenfible of, 
“ and it is what the wifeft of them apprehend every 
“ Day.” 
13. The Remarks that have been already made in the 
Courfe of this Seftion, upon the feveral Subjects to 
which it relates, make it unneceftary for me to detain 
the Reader very long with Obfervations at the Clofe. 
But, however, fome things are both fit and requifite to 
be faid here, for the Information of my Readers in ge- 
neral ; and for reminding thofe in particular, who have 
it in their Power to be ufeful to the Colonies. It is cer- 
tain, that from the very Time Sir Walter Raleigh, the 
Father of our Englijh Colonies, and his Aftbciates, firft 
projected thofe Eftablifhments, there have been many 
who have either found an Intereft, or took aPleafure, in 
mifreprefenting or leflening the Value of them. When the 
Intention of improving thefe diftant Countries, and the 
Advantages that were hoped for from it, were firft fet 
forth, there were fome who treated them not only as 
chimerical, but as dangerous ; They faid that it was very 
uncertain whether we might meet with Succefs, and if 
we did, it might difpeople the Nation. Thefe, and 
many other .Objediions, flowing partly from a Narrow- 
nefs of Underftanding, but I am afraid chiefly from a 
Narrownefs of Heart, have been difproved by Experience, 
which has ftiewn that what was then propofed was prac- 
ticable in itfelf, profitable in its Confequences, and attend- 
ed with none of thofe Mifchiefs that thefe timorous or 
ill intentioned People either apprehended or feemed to 
apprehend. 
The Difficulties which attended, and which will always 
attend. Settlements at the Beginning, proved a new Caufe 
of Clamour ; and many fpiteful things were faid about 
the facrificing fo many Englijhmen, to the obftinate Defire 
of fixing Colonies in Countries, which at that Time did 
not produce any great Advantages. But by Degrees, as 
thefe Difficulties were overcome, thofe Complaints like- 
wife ceafed, and we heard no more of thefe pretended 
Hardfhips; which, in reality, were no other than the 
fending fuch, as from the Perverfenefs of their own Dif- 
pofitions were capable only of doing Mifchief here ; fuch 
as the Severity of their Creditors would have deftined to 
VoL. II. Numb. 91, 
perpetual Imprifonment ; and fuch as, either from Lazi-* 
nefs or Indigence, would Have perilHed in our Streets, 
to be ufeful to themfelves and to the Community in the 
Colonies. 
But when thefe Complaints ceafed, others rofe in their 
ftead ; and when it could be no longer faid that the Co- 
lonies were ufelefs, it was alledged that they were not 
ufefi.]! enough to their Mother Country ; that while we 
were loaded with Taxes, they were abfolutely free, and 
that the Planters lived like Princes, while the Inhabitants 
of Great Britain laboured hard for a tolerable Subfiftance, 
This produced Cuftoms and Impofitions upon all Plan- 
tation Commodities, which if they are grievous to the 
Inhabitants of the Plantations, muft turn to our Difad- 
vantage as well as theirs, and confequently become a great 
Prejudice to both. At prefent there is a vaft Change in 
the Face of Affairs in thefe Parts of the World, which 
has confequently produced a Change in the Notions and 
Sentiments of thofe who are fettled there, and ought 
likewife to produce a Change in our Conduct. The prin- 
cipal Point in this Change is, the furprizing Growth of 
the French Power in America, from whence we have had 
many Warnings given us, which certainly were not re- 
ceived with fo much Attention as they ought to have 
been. If we had confidered, that in the Reign of King 
Charles II. when France had very little Trade, and her 
Colonies were of no great Confequence, fhe was almoft a 
Match for all Europe befide, and that too when the ma- 
ritime Powers were in their moft flourifliing Condition ; 
we might have eafily forefeen to what a Height her Power 
would increafe with the Help of Colonies and Commerce : 
But either we did not forefee it, or we fuffered ourfelves to 
be fo much taken up with nearer Objedls, that we did 
not fufficiently provide againft an Evil, which of ail others 
we ought moft to apprehend. 
The very thing that has hitherto hindered us from con- 
ceiving as we ought to do of our Danger, in this Ref- 
pedl, would have convinced us moft fully, if we had 
viewed it on the right Side, and reafoned upon it as be- 
came us. If we find that in Conjunftion with the great- 
eft Powers upon the Continent, we have not been able 
for fifty Years paft, to fet any Bounds to the Ambition 
of France in Europe, what Limits are we like to fet to 
her Power in America, when it comes to bear any Pro- 
portion there, to what fhe has attained here, and towards 
which, as we fee fhe has already made large Strides ? 
It may be anfwered, that at prefent fhe is very far 
from being equal to us in Strength in that Part of the 
World ; that the Colonies are very apt to think them- 
felves in Danger, long before they are fo ; and that if 
their Fears were really fo great as they would fometimes 
reprefent them, as they have a Force fuflicient, it is fcarce 
to be doubted that they would at length find a Will to 
help and relieve themfelves. We may anfwer to this, that 
if the French had a Power in America, in any Degree ap- 
proaching ours, our Care might probably come too late, 
efpecially confidering the great Change that has happened 
there, wFere, inftead of having all the World for Allies, 
we have hardly fo much as a Friend in Appearance, the 
Spaniards being become Friends to France, and the Dutch 
having neither Force, nor, perhaps. Inclination to affift us. 
The Nature of their Government alfo, though it makes 
their Subjedts lefs happy, makes their Colonies more 
formidable, and enables the Prince to protedl them more 
effedlually, and to grant them from Time to Time greater 
Encouragements •, fo that we need not wonder they have 
overcome fo many Difficulties, or that the Trade of the 
French Hands fhould be fo much more confiderable now, 
than it was at the Peace of Utrecht. We may be likewife 
fure of this, that the more their Trade increafes, the 
more it will be encouraged ; becaufe the French Miniftry 
pay a particular Regard thereto ; and as we have already 
Ihewn in our Hiftory of the Eajl India Company, they 
are never wanting to fuch as are not wanting to them- 
felves •, but from the great Principle of promoting the 
Grandeur of France, yield all the Affiftance they can to 
what they vifibly perceive will increafe the Wealth, and 
augment the naval Power, of the Kingdom. 
As to the Apprehenfions of the Colonies, Time has 
4 N ftiewn 
