Chap. IIL the Kingdom 
terrible to any other European Nation, would not very 
much alarm us 5 and yet nothing but a naval Force, and 
that too, afting at fome Diftance from their Ports, could 
be employed to difpoiTefs us of this Trade, in Gafe we 
were once poffeiTed of it. 
Taking therefore the whole of this Matter together^ 
there is nothing vifionary, romantick or abfurd, in fup- 
pofing that it might be worth the while of our Eajt- 
India Company, to make an Experiment of this kind, 
in which if they fucceeded they could have no Caufe to 
repent *, and if they did not fucceed, we lhall hereafter 
fhew, that the Difcoveries with which iuch an Attempt 
muft be attended, would very well compenlate the Ex- 
pences which fuch a Tryal would require. I likewife 
beg leave to add, that it would be no bad Policy for a 
great trading Company to make now and then llich an 
Attempt, for the Sake of National Advantage; becaufe 
it would be a juft and rational Recommendation of 
their Interefts to this, as to a trading Nation, and take 
off in a great Meafure that Load of Envy, which has 
long fat hard, and muft otherwife continue always to fit 
hard upon every exclufive Company. 
10. Whenever a Defign of this Sort fliall come to be 
maturely weighed, in order to its being put in Execu- 
tion, it will be natural to endeavour at deriving from it 
all the Advantages that are poffible, and amongft thefe 
I apprehend, there is none more obvious, than the re- 
viving thereby in fome Meafure our Commerce with 
Japan^ which has been now interrupted for a long Series 
of Years, and 1 believe was never fo much as thought 
of, at leaft as a Thing any way pradicable fince the 
Reign of King Charles II. We have already ftiown 
how the Trade is carried on between Corea and Japan^ 
and from thence, I think there naturally arifes a Prof- 
pedt of no lefs than three different Methods of making 
an Attempt of this Sort, favourable to fo important a 
Scheme. In the firft Place, we might hope for fome- 
thing by eftablifhing a Factory upon the Ifland of ^eU 
praet. It is very true, that the Butch loft a Ship there, 
in the Year 1653. but according to the Defcription gi- 
ven us by thofe that efcaped that Shipwreck, there is a 
tolerable Harbour on the South-fide of that Ifland, and 
more than one good R9ad on the Eaft-fide towards 
Japan. 
If therefore we could introduce a Trade there, we 
might in all Probability either enter into a diredt Com- 
merce with the Japonefe who frequent that Ifland, or at 
leaft purchafe many of their Commodities from the Co- 
reans, out of their Magazines. This I fay is the firft 
Method, and we are pretty fure that no great Difficul- 
ties could attend it, for by the Help of the Butch Charts, 
and we might poffibly have the Help of Dutch Seamen 
too, this Navigation either is or might be very foon to- 
lerably well known, and therefore I fhould ima- 
gine, that this might be firft tryed. The fecond 
Method is. attempting the Ifland of ’Em la taOy 
which as I have (hewn, is the diredl and capital Seat of 
Commerce between the Cor cans and the Japonefe^ and 
if upon this Ifland we could make a tolerable Eftablifli- 
ment, there can no Doubt arife, that we fliould be from 
thence able to carry on both the Corean and Japan 
Trade with equal Advantage, and this without giving 
any Umbrage either to the Chinefe or to the Japonefe. 
For with Refpedl to the former, they have never hi- 
therto pretended to confider this Ifland as dependant 
upon them, and therefore could not take any juft Co- 
lour of Offence at any Nation’s trading thither, and as 
for the Japonefe they feem to confider this Ifland in the 
fame Light, and as a Place that affords their Subjeds 
an Opportunity of gratifying their Defire for foreign 
Commodities, without Danger to the State ; one might 
therefore hope, that from the fame Views we might 
eftablifh a Fa6lory there, without being at all expofed 
to thofe uneafy and mortifying Circumftances that at- 
tend the Commerce of the Dutch in Japan., and which 
perhaps have been the chief Caufes, that for fo long a 
Trad; of Time, no ocher European Nation has ever 
judged.it expedient fo much as to attempt interfering 
with them. 
of C O R E A. I dop 
The third Method by which .we might poffibly come 
to a good Conclufion in this Affair, might be by feeling 
upon one or other of thofe two little Iflands, that lie 
to the Eaftward of Tui la tao^ and which in the Ghinep 
Maps are ftiled, Doro fma and Key /ima. Thefe are 
indeed very fmall Iflands but withal they are very con- 
veniently fituated, are within a Day’s Sail of one of the 
beft Ports in Corea., in lefs than a Day’s Sail of the Ja~ 
ponefe Coafls, and fo ntzv China^ that it would be very ea- 
fy to detach an annual Ship from thole that are conftant- 
ly fent to Canton,2ind for that Ship to join the Companies 
Veffels Irom that Port at Macao., in order to return in 
Confort to Europe. W^ith Refped £0 this third Me- 
thod, I do not think k difficult, though at the fame 
time, I muft confefs, I fhould not advife it to make a 
Defcent upon, and a Conqueft of which ever Ifland fhould 
be held moft convenient. We have already mentioned 
more than once, the Dutch Conqueft of Formofa^ which 
in Comparifon of either of thefe Iflands, is much the 
fame as Jamaica and St. Chridophers., or of Ireland, and 
the Ifle of Man % fo that methinks, if the Dutch Com- 
pany could undertake and maintain fuch a Conqueft as 
the former, there is nothing unreafonable in fuppofmg 
we might be able to atchieve the latter. Befides the 
fmaller our Acquifition was, the lefs Umbrage it would 
give, and the eafier it would be to keep. 
It may indeed be objedted, that if any Thing of this 
Kind was prafticable, it is highly probable the Dutch 
v>^ou!d have long ago undertaken it. At firft Sight, 
there is fomething in this plaufible enough but ; when 
thoroughly examined, this Objection will be found to 
have very little in it. For the Dutch have no Tempta- 
tion to a Thing of this kind, as they are already poff 
feffed of a fettled and profitable Trade with Japan j and 
we are too v/ell acquainted with the wife Maxims of 
that People, to fuppofe that they would rilk a Certainty 
for an Uncertainty, or fluit the Monopoly, which they 
now enjoy, for a kind of Trade in which they might 
be rivalled by fome other Nation, , But this is not at 
all our Gafe, we had formerly a Share jn this Trade as 
well as they, from which we are now excluded, and 
are like to remain forever excluded, unlefs we fhould 
make fome fuch Attempt as this to recover it 5 and 
though perhaps at firft, the Japonefe might be a little 
intradtable, and forbid their Subjefts holding any Cor- 
refpondence with us, yet by Degrees, and in Procefs of 
Time, we might very well hope to overcome their Jea- 
loufy and Averfion ; for when they found that we aimed 
at nothing farther than a Settlement for the Sake of 
Trade, and did not propofe any Encroachment upon 
their Dominions, they might be brought to confider us 
in the fame Light they do the Dutch, and admit, for 
their own Sakes, a regulated Commerce, under certain 
Reftri^ions 5 at leaft there are two Things morally 
certain, firft, that if we were fo eftabliflied, we might 
be able to fubfift by our Correfpondence with the Co- 
reans, who have a natural Propenfity to Trade, whe- 
ther we had any Intercourfe with the Inhabitants of 
Japan or not j and fecondly, that lying thus at a Diftance 
from their Coaft, we fhould be in very little Danger 
from the whole Force of the Japonefe Empire ; which 
was not the Cafe, when we were actually fettled on the 
Continent by their Permiffion, and under their Pro- 
tection. 
We may likewife add, that the Cafe of the Portu.- 
guefe at Macao, is a kind of Parallel to fuch an Efta- 
blifhment ; and though it is very true, that in its pre- 
fent Situation, that muft be allowed to be both a very 
mean and a very precarious Settlement, yet it was not 
always fuch, nor is the Force of the Portuguefe in the 
Ea[i-Indies at this time any way comparable to ours ; 
fo that if they, even with the little Power they have, 
are ftill in a Capacity of maintaining themfelves on 
the Coaft of China, we who have a much greater Power, 
might very well hope to compafs and fupport a bet* 
ter Settlement upon the Coafts of Japan. At leaft, 
there is no Harm in thinking of it, in ftating the Ar- 
guments in Favour of fuch a Thing, or in looking 
into and enquiring after the Advantages with which it 
might be attended. 
u 
I 
