Current Federal Law and Policy 
33 
onic stem cells came down to this question: Can the govern- 
ment support some human embryonic stem cell research with- 
out encouraging future embryo destruction? 
The present funding policy is therefore not an attempt to 
answer the question of how the government might best ad- 
vance embryonic stem cell research while conforming to the 
law on the subject. Rather, it is an attempt to answer the 
question of how the government might avoid encouraging the 
(presumptively) imethical act of embryo destruction and still 
advance the worthy cause of medical research. Whether or not 
one agrees with the premises defining the question, and 
whether or not one accepts the logic of the answer, any as- 
sessment of the policy must recognize this starting point. 
From the very beginning, the policy has been described — 
even by many of its supporters and defenders — as occupying a 
kind of middle-ground position in the debate over the morality 
of embryo research. It has been termed a "Solomonic compro- 
mise." But while it may be a prudential compromise on the 
question of funding, it has been argued that the policy — as 
articulated by its authors — does not seem to be intended as a 
compromise on the question of the moral status of human 
embryos or the moral standing of the act of embryo destruc- 
tion. In this sense, it appears to be not a political “splitting of 
the difference" but an effort at a principled solution.^® 
To some extent, the effort reflects a traditional approach in 
moral philosophy to an ancient and vexing question: Can one 
benefit from the results of (what one believes to be) a past 
immoral act without becoming complicit in that act?* The 
moralists’ approach suggests that one may make use of such 
benefits if (and only if) three crucial conditions are met: (1) 
Non-cooperation: one does not cooperate or actively involve 
oneself in the commission of the act; (2) Non-abetting: one 
does nothing to abet or encourage the repetition of the act, for 
instance by providing incentives or rewards to those who 
would perform it in the future; and (3) Reaffirmation of the 
Readers should note that in reporting on this approach, as applicable to 
President Bush's stem cell decision, the Council is not itself declaring its 
own views on whether the past act of embryo destruction was “immoral." 
(Some of us think it was, some of us think it wasn’t.) We are rather describ- 
ing what we understand to be the moral logic of the decision as put forward. 
PRE -PUBLICATION VERSION 
