Appendix G. 
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opponents of this research have ritualistically condemned the 
destruction of early embryos but uncritically celebrated adult stem 
cell work, supporters of embryonic stem cell research have typically 
insisted on using embryos left over horn IVF procedures, while 
repudiating the use of embryos created solely for research. Indeed, 
insisting on the distinction between so-called "spare" embryos and 
"research” embryos and endorsing only the use of spare embryos has 
been one way that supporters of embryo research have tried to 
demonstrate their "respect” for the embryo. Yet, it is worth asking 
whether the spare embryo/research embryo distinction does not, to 
borrow Daniel Callahan's image, provide a kind of "wafting incense” 
to mask what supporters still find a disquieting smell (Callahan, 
1995).^ 
Although the debate about stem cell research might have been 
framed in terms of the abortion controversy in any event, the HERP 
report insured that the initial debate over stem cell work that 
followed in aftermath of the public armouncement of the work of John 
Gearhart (Shamblott et al., 1998) and James Thomson in 1998 
(Thomson et al.) would be navigated in the wake of the conflict over 
abortion. As I indicated, the upshot is that the discussion about stem 
cell research has been more cramped than it might otherwise have 
been. The discussion has been too focused on the details of 
embryological development; too focused on the differences between 
those who view the early embryo as a person and those who do not; 
and far too individualistically oriented. Before turning to ways that 
the debate might be become less cramped, let me focus more 
concretely on these difficulties. 
The point about the debate being framed too individualistically 
is nicely illustrated in an article on abortion by Lisa Sowle Cahill 
entitled "Abortion, Autonomy, and Community” (Cahill, 1996). Cahill 
begins this article by claiming that, in discussing the morality of 
abortion, there is no way to avoid the question of the status of the 
fetus. Nevertheless, she says, the debate about fetal status is almost 
always conducted with the goal of determining the rights involved, 
where rights are understood very individualistically. To the degree 
that the fetus is acknowledged to have rights, those rights are pitted 
against the rights of the pregnant women. Although Cahill doubts 
that we can jettison the use of rights language altogether, if we are 
going to use rights language, she says, we must "remove that 
language from the context of moral and political liberalism” (361). If 
we do so, we might be able to see that we have duties and 
obligations to which we do not explicitly consent. As Cahill puts it, 
"such obligations originate simply in the sorts of reciprocal 
relatedness that constitutes being a human” (361).® For example. 
PRE -PUBLICATION VERSION 
