198 • Impacts of Applied Genetics— Micro-Organisms, Plants, and Animals 
that were thought to have a potential for harm 
—particularly those that were designed to 
transfer genes for potent toxins or for resist- 
ance to antibiotics into bacteria of a different 
species— were also deferred. Finally, one other 
type of experiment, in which genes from higher 
organisms might have been combined with vec- 
tors, was to be postponed. The fear was that la- 
tent "cancer-causing genes” might be inadver- 
tently passed on to E. coli. 
Throughout the moratorium, one point was 
certain: no evidence existed to show that harm 
would come from these experiments. But it was 
a possibility. The scientists who originally raised 
questions wrote in 1975: ". . . few, if any, believe 
that this methodology is free from risk.”^ It was 
recognized at that time that ". . . estimating the 
risks will be difficult and intuitive at first but 
this will improve as we acquire additional 
knowledge.”^ Hence two principles were to be 
followed: containment of the micro-organisms 
(see table 35, p. 213) was to be an essential part 
of any experiment; and the level of containment 
was to match the estimated risk. These prin- 
ciples were incorporated into the Guidelines for 
Research Involving Recombinant DNA Mole- 
cules, promulgated by NIH in 1976. 
But the original fears surrounding rDNA re- 
search progressed beyond concern that humans 
might be harmed. Ecological harm to plants, ani- 
mals, and the inanimate world were also consid- 
ered. And other critics noted the possibility of 
moral and ethical harm, which might disrupt 
both society’s structure and its system of values. 
Classification of potential 
physical harm 
Some combinations of DNA may be harmful 
to man or his environment— e.g., if an entire 
DNA copy of the poliovirus genetic material is 
combined with E. coli plasmid DNA, few would 
argue against the need for careful handling of 
this material. 
For practical purposes, the potential harm 
associated with various micro-organisms is 
^Recombinant DNA Research, vol. 1, DHEW publication No. (NIH) 
76-1138, August 1976, p. 59. 
^Ibid. 
shown in figure 35. Each letter (A through L) 
represents the consequence of a particular com- 
bination of events and micro-organisms. For ex- 
ample, the letters: 
A, C represent the intentional release of micro- 
organisms known to be harmful to the 
environment or to man— e.g., in biologi- 
cal warfare or terrorism. 
B, D represent the inadvertent release of 
micro-organisms known to be harmful to 
the environment or to man— e.g., in acci- 
dents at high-containment facilities 
where work is being carried out with 
dangerous micro-organisms. 
E, I represent the intentional release of micro- 
organisms thought to be safe hut which 
prove harmful— when the safety of orga- 
nisms has been misjudged. 
F, J represent the intentional release of micro- 
organisms which prove safe as expected— 
e.g., in oil recovery, mining, agriculture, 
and pollution control. 
H,L represent the inadvertent release of 
micro-organisms which have no harmful 
consequences— e.g., in ordinary accidents 
with harmless micro-organisms. 
G, K represent the inadvertent release of 
micro-organisms thought to be safe hut 
which prove harmful— ihe most unlikc'ly 
possible consecjuence, because both an 
accident must occur and a misjudgnu'nt 
about the safety must ha\’e heiMi made. 
Discussions of physical harm have rei'ogni/.ed 
the possibility of intentional misusi' hut ha\c 
minimized its likelihood. Fhe GoiniMition on the 
Prohibition of the Dexelopment, IModuclion, 
and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) 
and Toxin Weapons and on th(>ir’ Destruction-' 
which was ratified by both the Senate and the 
President in 1975,* * states that the' signatories 
will "never develo[i . . . biological agi'iits or tox- 
ins . . . that have no justification for prophylac- 
tic, protective, or other j)(>ac('ful purposes. " 
Such a provision clearly includes miero-oiga- 
nisms carrying rDNA molecules or th(' toxins 
■’C:onvention of the I’t-ohibiliou ol the I )i-v elopmenl l’it«lin lion 
and Stockpiling of llaclei'iological IHiologicall and Iomii \\ra(Min^ 
and On Their Destruction. Washington l ondon. .tiul Xtosiou 
Apr. 10, 1972: enteri-d into force on Mai 26 1 97.5 126 I s 1 '•.so 
*As of 1980, 80 countiies have ralilied the lie.ilv anolln-i in 
have signed hut not ratified 
