Ch.10 — The Question of Risk • 207 
fungi, and higher organisms can all he fused or 
manipulated. * 
Opponents of rDX.A ha\e stated that combin- 
ing genes from different species may disturb an 
e.xtremely intricate ecological interaction that is 
onl\' dimly understood. Hence, such e.xperi- 
ments, it is argued, are unpredictable and there- 
fore hazardous. If so, all the other methods 
represented in figure 35 should he included in 
the (iuidelines. \ et they are not. 
rhe most acceptable e.xplanation for this in- 
consistency is that rl),\.\ is currenth’ the most 
*Kor example, anlihiotie reNi.siant pla.smicls ha\e been tran.>;- 
I'eiTtHl from Staphylocotxus aurvus to Radllus suhtilis acros.s 
sp«'eies barriers by transtormation, not by rON A. Foreign genes 
for the enzyme amyla.s** hax e al.so been inlixHlueed into fl. sublilis. 
efficient and successful method of combining 
genes from \ ery diverse organisms. It is reason- 
able to ask, however, what would happen if any 
of the other methods become equally success- 
ful. Will a profusion of guidelines appear? Will 
one committee oversee all genetic experiments 
Ethical and moral concerns 
The perceixed risk associated with genetic 
engineering includes ethical and moral hazards 
as well as physical ones. It is important to 
recognize that these are part of the general 
topic of risk. To some, there is just as much risk 
to social values and structure as to human 
health and the environment. (For further dis- 
cussion see ch. 13.) 
Conclusion 
Thus far, no demonstrable harm associated 
with genetic engineering, and particularly 
rDX.A, has been found. But although demonstra- 
ble harm is based on e\ idence that damage has 
occurred at one time or another, it does not 
mean that damage cannot occur. 
Conjectural hazards based on analogies and 
scenarios ha\e been addressed and most ha\ e 
proxed less xxorrisome than prexiously as- 
sumed. Xexertheless, there is agreement that 
certain experiments, such as the transfer of 
genes for knoxvn toxins or x enoms into bacteria, 
should still be prohibited because of the real 
likelihood of danger. Still other experiments 
cannot clearly be shoxvn to be hazardous or 
readily dismissed as harmless. Hence, a political 
decision is likely to be required to establish 
xvhat constitutes acceptable proof and xvho 
must prox ide it. 
Gix en that potential harm can be identified in 
some cases, its probable occurrence and magni- 
tude quantified, and perceived risk taken into 
account, a decision to proceed is usually based 
on society’s xvillingness to take the risk. This 
triad of the physical {actual risk), psychological 
{perception of risk), and political {willingness to 
take risk) plays a role in all decisions relating to 
genetic engineering. 
The potential benefits must always be con- 
sidered along with the risks. Decisions made by 
RAC haxe reflected this view— e.g., when it 
approx'ed the cloning of the genetic material of 
the foot-and-mouth disease virus. The perceived 
benefits to millions of animals outweighed the 
potential hazard. 
Recombinant DNA techniques represent just 
one of several methods to join fragments of 
DNA from different organisms. The current 
Guidelines do no extend to these other tech- 
niques, although they share some of the same 
uncertainties. Ignoring the consequences of the 
other technologies might be viewed as an incon- 
sistency in policy- 
while the initial concerns about the possibili- 
ty of hazards at the laboratory level appear to 
have been overstated, other types of potential 
hazards at different stages of the technology 
have been identified. Emphasis has shifted 
somewhat from conjectured hazards that might 
arise from research and development to those 
that might be associated with production tech- 
nologies. As a consequence, there is a clearer 
mandate for existing Federal regulatory agen- 
cies to play a role in ensuring safety in industrial 
settings. 
