Ch.12 — Patenting Living Organisms • 241 
scope. .\loi'eo\ er, \\ lien these law s wei'e last re- 
codified in 1952, tht' congressional committee 
reports att irmed the intent of (Congress that pat- 
entable subject mattei’ "include an\ thing under 
the sun that is made h\’ man.’'* *^ I'he ('ourt 
acknow ledged that not e\ ervthing is patentable; 
laws of nature, physical phenomena, and 
ahsti'act ideas are not. 
The ('ourt founti the (io\ ernment’s argu- 
ments unpersuasi\ e. S|)ecifically, that [lassing 
the Plant Patent .Act of 1930 and the Plant \ arie- 
ty Protection .\ct of 1970, which excluded bac- 
teria, was evidence of congressional under- 
standing that section 101 did not apply to liv ing 
organisms: otherwise: these statutes would 
have been unnecessary. In disagreeing, the 
CA)urt stated that the 1930 Act was necessary to 
overcome the belief that even artificially bred 
plants were unpatentable [products of nature 
atul to relax the written description require- 
ment, pei niitting a description as complete as is 
"reasonably possible.” As for the 1970 ,Act, the 
Court stated that it had been passed to extend 
patent-like protection to new sexually reproduc- 
ing varieties, which, in 1930, were believed to 
he incapable of reproducing in a stable, uniform 
manner. The 1970 .Act's exclusion of bacteria, 
which indicated to the Government that Con- 
gress had not intended bacteria to be pat- 
entable, was considered insignificant for a num- 
ber of reasons. 
The Gov ernment had also argued that Con- 
gress could not have intended section 101 to 
cover genetically engineered micro-organisms, 
since the technology was unforeseen at the 
time. The majority responded that the very pur- 
pose of the patent law was to encourage new, 
unforeseen inv entions, w hich was why section 
101 was so broadly worded. Furthermore, as 
for the “gruesome parade of horribles"" that 
might possibly be associated with genetic engi- 
neering, the Court stated that the denial of a 
patent on a micro-organism might slow the sci- 
entific work but certainly would not stop it; and 
the consideration of such issues involves policy 
judgments that the legislative and executive 
®S. Rept. .No. 1979, 82d Cong., 2d sess.. p. 5, 1952: H.R. Repl. N'o. 
1923, 82d Cong.. 2d sess., p. 6. 1952, cited in Diamond v. 
Chakrabartv. 100 S.Ct. 2204. 2207 (1980). 
• Diamonds. Chakrabartv, 100 S.Ct. 2204, 2211 (1980). 
branches of Government, and not the courts, 
are competent to make. It further recognized 
that Congress could amend section 101 to spe- 
cificallv exclude genetically engineered orga- 
nisms or could write a statute specifically de- 
signed for them. 
The dissenting Justices agreed that the issue 
was one of statutory interpretation, but inter- 
preted section 101 differently. They saw the 
two plant protection Acts as strong ev idence of 
congressional intent that section 101 not cover 
living organisms. In view of this, the dissenters 
maintained that the majority opinion was ac- 
tually extending the scope of the patent law's 
beyond the limit set by C'ongress. 
rhe stated narrowness of the Court’s decision 
may limit its impact as precedent in subsequent 
cases that raise similar issues, although not nec- 
essarily. Certainly, the decision applies to any 
genetically engineered micro-organism. It is a 
technical distinction vvitho(.it legal significance 
that most of the work being done on such orga- 
nisms involves recombinant DNA (rDNA) tech- 
niques, which Chakrabartv did not use. The real 
question is whether or not it would permit the 
patenting of other genetically engineered or- 
ganisms, such as plants, animals, and insects. 
•Any fears that the decision might serve as a 
legal precedent for the patenting of human be- 
ings in the distant future are totally groundless. 
Under our legal system, the ow'nership of hu- 
mans is absolutely prohibited by the 13th 
amendment to the Constitution. 
Although the Chakrabarty case involved a 
micro-organism, there is no reason that its ra- 
tionale could not be applied to other organisms. 
In the majority’s view, the crucial test for pat- 
entability concerned whether or not the micro- 
organism was manmade. Conceptually, there is 
nothing in this test that limits it to micro- 
organisms. The operative distinction is between 
humanmade and naturally occurring "things,” 
regardless of what they are. Thus, the Chakra- 
barty opinion could be read as precedent for in- 
cluding any genetically engineered organism 
(except humans) within the scope of section 101. 
Whether a court in a subsequent case will inter- 
pret Chakrabarty broadly or narrowly cannot be 
predicted. 
