THE LAW RELATING TO DEER AND GROUND GAME 
only a right to the feathered game, with a partial right to the ground game; 
for as “ occupier ” he is bound (under this section of the Act) not to divest 
himself wholly of his right to kill the hares and rabbits, however willing 
he may be to do so. All he can do is to refrain from exercising this in- 
alienable right. 
Section 3 of the Act accordingly provides that any agreement in con- 
travention of the occupier’s right to kill ground game would be void; that 
is to say, that no such agreement could be enforced in a court of law if 
either of the parties happened to change his mind and refused to fulfil 
his contract.* 
In the case of Morgan v. Jackson, where an occupier brought an action 
to recover rent from a shooting tenant to whom he had let his right to 
the ground game, and who pleaded in defence that the contract was void 
under section 3 of the Act, it was held, on appeal to the Divisional Court 
of Queen’s Bench, by Mr Justice Day and Mr Justice Wright, that section 3 
was intended only to prevent a tenant and landlord from combining 
together to defeat the Act. There was nothing in that section (they said) 
to prevent the tenant— who was entitled otherwise than in pursuance 
of the Act to kill and take ground game — being just as free as he would 
have been before the Act, and in their opinion section 3 did not apply, 
since it merely prevented a tenant from surrendering his right to his land- 
lord. Although this interpretation is contrary to the expressed intention 
of the legislature (as may be seen on reference to the Parliamentary report 
of the debate when the Bill was in Committee), the position seems to be 
that an occupier of lands owning the exclusive right to the ground game 
(as when a landlord in letting has not reserved the game and rabbits) 
may let the sporting rights, and recover the rent, if his tenant is not his 
landlord. If his shooting tenant were also his landlord, the Court might 
possibly hold the contract void and the rent irrecoverable. But in either 
case an “ occupier ” who is exclusive owner of sporting rights, cannot 
divest himself of his concurrent right to kill the ground game, and while 
nominally letting the exclusive right, he, literally speaking, lets only the 
concurrent right so far as the ground game is concerned. 
An application for leave to appeal (which had been refused by the Divi- 
sional Court) was made in the Court of Appeal before the Master of the 
Rolls and Lord Justices Day and A. L. Smith (in July, 1895), and was again 
refused. Accordingly the position of the occupier as above explained 
* See Hicks v. Smith, 1888, and Morgan v. Jackson, 1895 ; 1 Q.B., 885 ; 72 L.T. 593, 
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