Chapter 4 
Ethical Considerations 
The range of opinion on the rights and wrongs 
of using animals to satisfy human needs is as broad 
as the political spectrum itself. At one extreme, 
animals are thought to be entitled to at least a por- 
tion of the respect, individual freedom, and dig- 
nity that are considered to be basic human rights. 
Some say that animals should be recognized as be- 
longing to a community that includes humans. At 
the other extreme, humans are thought to have 
broad and absolute authority over the lives and 
interests of animals. From this perspective, expe- 
diency alone, not morality, dictates what we may 
do with animals. 
To illustrate the distance between these extremes, 
a recent legal brief for animal rights can be con- 
trasted with a televised interview with three scien- 
tists who perform animal experimentation. Ac- 
cording to the brief (43): 
If being alive is the basis for being a moral ob- 
ject, and if all other interests and needs are predi- 
cated upon life, then the most basic, morally rele- 
vant aspect of a creature is its life. We may 
correctively suggest that any animal, therefore, 
has a right to life. 
The scientists, in a televised exchange with Harvard 
philosopher Robert Nozick, were asked whether 
the fact that an experiment will kill hundreds of 
animals is ever regarded by scientists as a reason 
for not performing it. One answered: “Not that 
I know of.” When Nozick asked whether the ani- 
mals count at all, one scientist replied, “Why should 
they?” while another added that he did not think 
that experimenting on animals raised a moral is- 
sue at all (45). 
People at both extremes would probably agree 
that, given a choice between experiments equiva- 
lent in cost and scientific value, one that does not 
require the destruction of animals would be prefer- 
able to one that does. This consensus, however, 
would probably evaporate if animal experimen- 
tation produced greater scientific validity or the 
technique that used animals had significant cost 
advantages. 
In morals, as in politics, most people tend to shun 
extremes. However, a middle view is at once the 
most defensible and the most difficult to defend. 
Pitted against extreme or esoteric positions, the 
numbers on its side create a presumption in its 
favor. Yet a presumption given only by the weight 
of opinion will not amount to a moral justification. 
A belief is not shown to be true simply by count- 
ing the votes of those who accept it. Some basis 
for an opinion, independent of it being accepted, 
must be found. 
Adoption of a middle view is hazardous in two 
respects. First, it runs the risk of inconsistency. 
Propositions located at polar extremes will usu- 
ally contradict one another, and a position that 
seeks to incorporate both may find itself embrac- 
ing a contradiction. In the case of toxicity testing, 
for example, it may not seem possible to respect 
the interests of experimental animals and yet use 
them as tools for enhancing human health and 
safety. 
The second risk is that consistency will be se- 
cured at a price too high, by way of a theoretically 
unattractive ad hoc device. In principle, two con- 
tradictory propositions can be reconciled simply 
by making one an exception to the other. It could, 
for example, be stipulated that the general rule 
against harming animals does not hold when they 
are used to test for toxicity. But it is one thing to 
say this and another to give a reason for it. Com- 
plex rules, introduced for no reason other than 
to remove a particular inconsistency, muddy a 
point of view without shedding any light on the 
hard moral cases it must address. More important, 
they are arbitrary. 
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