Ch. 4— Ethical Considerations • 81 
stricted sense. In unrestricted necessity, the end 
is open to assessment on utilitarian grounds: 
• How likely is the objective to be met, in compari- 
son with other possible goals? If the LD S0 test 
yields unreliable results, its necessity in the 
unrestricted sense would be open to challenge. 
• Assuming that the objective will be met, how 
beneficial will it be? Suppose, for instance, that 
an LD 50 test were to be run on a new cosmetic 
not significantly different from those already 
on the market. The test may be considered 
unnecessary because the objective is unnec- 
essary. 
Unrestricted necessity is more difficult to prove, 
because it always includes restricted necessity and 
more. Thus, a stringent standard of necessity, one 
that lets fewer procedures through, would require 
that a procedure be necessary in the unrestricted 
sense. In addition, since necessity is more difficult 
to establish than the possibility of substitution, the 
burden of proving both the existence of necessity 
and the absence of alternatives could be placed 
on those who would use the procedure. A more 
lenient test could invert these priorities by pre- 
suming that the procedure is necessary and that 
alternatives are lacking unless shown otherwise. 
This approach would not expect the user to show 
beforehand that no other alternative was avail- 
able; it is generally followed when a research pro- 
posal is reviewed by a scientist’s peers or an insti- 
tutional animal care and use committee (27). 
Nonutilitarian positions on the use of animals 
have one feature in common: Although virtually 
none ignores consequences, they unite in deny- 
ing that a course of action can be justified wholly 
by appeal to the value of its consequences (39). 
This leaves room for substantial variation, with 
the differences traceable to the considerations they 
would add in order to complete a moral assessment. 
Ironically, both extremes in the animal treatment 
debate are nonutilitarian. The hard line support- 
ing unlimited exploitation of animals builds from 
the premise that animals lack moral standing. With- 
out rights, they cannot be recipients of a duty owed 
to them. On some theories of value, moreover, en- 
joyment does not count as a good thing in itself, 
nor is suffering per se an evil. Kant, for example, 
thought that the only unconditional good was a 
will whose choices are undetermined by desire 
for enjoyment or fear of punishment (31). Not hav- 
ing a will, animals could not have this value. 
Morally, they were indistinguishable from inani- 
mate tools— mere means to be used for the pur- 
poses of beings who do have a will. Like Aquinas, 
however, Kant did acknowledge an indirect duty 
of kindness, given that "tender feelings toward 
dumb animals develop humane feelings toward 
mankind” (32). 
#he indirect duty theory stumbles in the attempt 
to explain why there should be any empirical con- 
nection at all between people's feelings for animals 
and their feelings for other humans. Some simi- 
larity must be seen in the objects of the two senti- 
ments if one is to influence the other; yet the the- 
ory says that there is no such likeness in reality. 
Thus either a person’s motive is proof by itself that 
humans have a direct moral interest in animals, 
in which case the theory is mistaken; or the the- 
ory is correct and the individual has misunder- 
stood it, in which case the person will be free, once 
educated in the theory, to abuse animals without 
fear that this will tempt abuse of human beings. 
Kant cannot have it both ways : He cannot require 
individuals to act on a belief that his own theory 
alleges to be false (33). 
The Kantian position could be turned on its head 
if animals had moral standing after all. In The Case 
for Animal Rights , Regan gives the most cogent 
defense to date for that view. He concedes that 
animals are not moral agents: Since they are un- 
able to choose freely among impartially determined 
moral alternatives, they cannot have any moral 
duties. At least some animals, however, have be- 
liefs, desires, memory, a sense of the future, prefer- 
ences, an identity over time, and an individual wel- 
fare of their own (41). In these respects, they are 
indistinguishable from human infants and men- 
tal defectives, who also fail to qualify as moral 
agents. Nevertheless, these animals possess an in- 
herent value, independent of the value that their 
experiences may have, that gives them standing 
as "moral patients” — that is, as individuals on the 
receiving end of the right and wrong actions of 
moral agents. They have this value equally, and 
equally with moral agents (40). Inherent value in 
turn gives them a claim, or right, to certain 
treatment. 
