Ch. 14— State Regulation of Animal Use • 309 
humane societies or societies for the prevention 
of cruelty to animals (74). These limited grants 
of authority are most frequently extended to sei- 
zure of animals found to be cruelly treated, ne- 
glected, or abandoned, in violation of an applica- 
ble State law. In some States, officers or agents 
of these groups possess specific powers for inter- 
vention, inspection, or the procurement of war- 
rants or summonses or the ability to be deputized 
by local law enforcement officials for such pur- 
poses. In New York, for example, lawfully ap- 
pointed agents of the American Society for the 
Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (ASPCA) have 
been judicially recognized as "peace officers” and 
are therefore authorized to issue summonses for 
violations of anticruelty laws. Another New York 
State case allowed the ASPCA to seize without a 
warrant and impound animals held in violation 
of cruelty statutes. 
In States where no powers are specified or im- 
plied, societies formed for this purpose have de- 
veloped investigative programs on which State or 
local law enforcement officers rely for prelimi- 
nary investigative activities. There appears to be 
some movement away from statutory grants of 
authority to nongovernmental agencies for this 
purpose. Several States have repealed prior grants 
and others have left undisturbed laws with no 
mention of them. Beyond enforcement through 
specific grants of police power, many anticruelty 
groups initiate criminal investigations by filing 
complaints or resorting to civil actions against 
agencies or facilities to enjoin alleged cruelty to 
animals (33,36). 
Several State anticruelty statutes have been at- 
tacked on grounds that they are unconstitution- 
ally vague, either because the statute allegedly 
fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair 
notice that a contemplated act is forbidden or be- 
cause the statute as drafted encourages arbitrary 
arrests and convictions. In almost all instances, 
both active cruelty and duty-of-care provisions 
have survived constitutional challenges based on 
vagueness, even though their breadth and lack 
of definition and specificity makes them suscep- 
tible to such attacks (9,62). 
Cruel Acts 
An Arizona statute outlawing cockfighting was 
found to be unconstitutionally vague in its use of 
the terms "animal” and "needless suffering,” and 
two convictions were overturned (104). Disparate 
results were reached in cases brought for con- 
victions for the same activity in Kansas and Ha- 
waii (86,105); the court was able to sustain the 
statute in the latter case because statutory defi- 
nitions of "animals” and "cruelty” helped over- 
come problems of vagueness. These cases are in- 
structive for another reason. When convictions 
have been thrown out, it is because courts have 
been unwilling to interpret general statutes to for- 
bid cockfights in the absence of legislative action 
making these previously acceptable acts illegal. 
Duty of Care 
Courts have applied the same general princi- 
ples of construction used in constitutional chal- 
lenges to anticruelty statutes in upholding their 
components governing minimum husbandry or 
humane treatment standards. High courts in at 
least two States have sustained legislative estab- 
lishment of broad standards of care, but judicial 
interpretations of the application of those stand- 
ards varies. For example, a Texas court found, 
without explanation, that the duty-of-care statute 
"sufficiently informs an accused of the nature and 
cause of the accusation against him and that it 
is not unconstitutionally indefinite.” Idaho’s Su- 
preme Court upheld the legislature’s intent to 
establish broad standards of care, suggesting that 
"proper care” is that degree of care that a pru- 
dent person would use under similar circum- 
stances. Virginia’s statute attempts to define the 
terms "adequate feed” and "adequate water,” but 
ultimately the standard adopted is a "reasonable 
level of nutrition,” though it adds nothing to the 
law’s specificity. Thus, the duty charged to any- 
one responsible for animal care is speculative, 
though the duty implicitly requires knowledge of 
the animal's requirements (33). 
Review of the available case law indicates that 
courts are reluctant to accept constitutional at- 
tacks even against vague and undefined anti- 
cruelty statutes, preferring to limit themselves to 
measuring defendants’ conduct against general 
statutory provisions on a case-by-case basis. 
