310 • Alternatives to Animal Use in Research, Testing, and Education 
Judicial Interpretation of 
Applicability of Anticruelty 
Statutes to Research 
Historically, those interested in protecting lab- 
oratory animals from cruelty have used general 
anticruelty statutes against research facilities or 
individual researchers, but (at least until 1981) to 
little effect. In 1914, for example, the Women’s 
SPCA sued six faculty members at a Pennsylvania 
medical school for "wanton cruelty,” but no con- 
viction resulted (33). 
Two recent cases give some indication how a 
modern State court might respond to a confron- 
tation between anticruelty and research interests. 
The Taub Decision 
The most celebrated and controversial case 
in this area is Maryland v. Taub. Montgomery 
County police investigated conditions at a labora- 
tory that was performing stroke research on non- 
human primates that was funded by the National 
Institutes of Health (NIH). The investigation re- 
sulted in seizure of the primate colony. In Janu- 
ary 1982, the county's State’s attorney filed 17 
charges against the investigator, Edward Taub, 
charging him with violation of Maryland Code, 
Article 27, Section 59 (1957, 1976 Repl. Vol.), with 
respect to each of 17 primates. Following a trial 
in district court, the defendant was found guilty 
of failing to provide necessary veterinary care for 
6 animals and acquitted of all other charges. On 
appeal to the circuit court, a jury hearing the case 
de novo found Taub guilty of one charge of fail- 
ing to provide necessary veterinary care for 1 
monkey, known as "Nero” (76). 
Taub appealed to the Maryland Court of Ap- 
peals, asserting that the law was unconstitution- 
al because the Federal Animal Welfare Act pre- 
empted State jurisdiction in the area of federally 
funded research, and attacking several of the trial 
court’s evidentiary rulings. The Maryland high 
court reversed the circuit court's decision and 
remanded the case with instructions to dismiss 
the charges (32). Tracing the legislative history 
of the Maryland statute from 1890 to its last re- 
vision in 1976, the court concluded that the leg- 
islature had not intended the statute to apply to 
this type of research activity under a Federal pro- 
gram, basing its ruling on three points: 
• The legislative intent was interpreted as ex- 
empting from punishment acts not involving 
"unnecessary” or “unjustifiable” pain, given 
exceptions for "customary and normal veteri- 
nary and agricultural husbandry practices” 
and the last sentence of Section 59, which 
states: 
It is the intention of the General Assembly 
that all animals shall be protected from in- 
tentional cruelty, but that no person shall be 
liable for normal human activities to which 
the infliction of pain to an animal is purely 
incidental and unavoidable. 
• The court imputed to the assembly “aware- 
ness” of the Federal Animal Welfare Act, 
which constituted a “comprehensive plan for 
the protection of animals used in research 
facilities, while at the same time recognizing 
and preserving the validity of use of animals 
in research.” 
• Taub's laboratory was subject to detailed reg- 
ulations of the U.S. Department of Agricul- 
ture (USDA), which set forth specifications 
for humane handling, care, treatment, trans- 
portation, and veterinary care. With respect 
to the latter, the court noted that Federal law 
recognized and preserved the validity of ani- 
mal research. The court also noted the ap- 
plication of NIH’s grant requirements to the 
defendant’s project (32). 
The Maryland statute neither generally ex- 
empted scientific research from the reach of its 
anticruelty law nor regulated experimentation 
separately, as some others do. (In 1984, the Mary- 
land General Assembly enacted a law that made 
the anticruelty statute’s application to research 
activities less ambiguous.) The Maryland court’s 
disposition of the case illustrates a judicial reluc- 
tance to find cruelty in an activity of some rec- 
ognized social utility. Its value as a bellwether for 
other States is limited, however, for several rea- 
sons. First, although the case may be cited by 
other defendants as a helpful precedent, it is law 
only in Maryland. Second, the holding in this case 
may be limited to its particular facts. At the trial 
that resulted in conviction, a substantial amount 
of testimony was heard on the issue of adequate 
