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rado regulations prohibiting the importation of 
pets for resale from States with less stringent 
licensing laws and regulations covering commer- 
cial pet dealers. The court found preemptive capa- 
bility, holding that Congress used an enumerated 
power to effectuate an enumerated power: regu- 
lating interstate commerce. The challenge to the 
State law was not sustained, however; the court 
found that the act not only "clearly did not indi- 
cate preemptive intent, but rather, expressly en- 
dorsed state-federal cooperation" (119). 
Criticisms 
Despite the fact that it set the stage for future 
collisions between research and animal interests, 
the Taub case is not particularly valuable for re- 
solving such conflicts, since the court avoided con- 
stitutional questions in reaching its decision. The 
decision suggests that when a court is confronted 
with a difficult case involving sharply contrasting 
but supportable interests and obscure legal prin- 
ciples whose potential impact on a decision far 
outweighs their understandability in application, 
it will go to extraordinary lengths to avoid that 
decision. It is a natural and conservative reaction 
for a judge to decline an invitation to make law 
that prejudices an existing enforcement system, 
however imperfect, when the legislature has 
shown no inclination to do so itself. The mixture 
of enumerated powers supporting the Animal 
Welfare Act, coupled with evidence that Congress 
did not intend to preempt the field of research 
regulation, are probably sufficient to avoid 
preemption. That result, however, cannot be pre- 
dicted with any confidence. 
Animal welfare advocates criticize general anti- 
cruelty laws as being ineffective in protecting 
animals from harm (19,29,124). The statutes’ 
vagueness and the frequent requirement for some 
degree of culpability both exact high standards 
of proof and subject statutes to a greater risk of 
ineffectiveness . Other criticisms are that general 
anticruelty statutes fail to anticipate and prevent 
cruelty or neglect, instead taking effect only when 
a sustainable complaint is entered. Enforcement 
of these statutes is generally entrusted to local 
law enforcement agencies, which for a number 
of reasons typically assign them a comparatively 
low priority. State regulations and local proce- 
dures for investigating and building a criminal 
case against a violator are complex, involving com- 
plicated rules governing warrants and searches. 
Fines are low, as a rule, and criminal violations 
comparatively hard to prove. When convictions 
are obtained, fines assessed against violators are 
generally collected by the State, though humane 
societies or SPCAs with limited enforcement au- 
thority must spend their own funds to investigate 
and prove cases (33,36). 
Recent Initiatives in 
Anticruelty Laws 
Critics of current anticruelty statutes, who have 
pressed to extend the laws’ reach to research 
activities, have not met with a great deal of suc- 
cess. They insist that two basic changes must be 
made if anticruelty laws are to be enforced mean- 
ingfully: First, animal welfare specialists must be 
trained and used; second, those trained specialists 
must be given increased enforcement authority 
(81). One situation hailed as a model is Massachu- 
setts’ creation of a private right -of -action and its 
delegation to the Massachusetts SPCA and, more 
recently, to the Animal Rescue League, of author- 
ity to act as agents of the Commissioner of Health 
in enforcing the State’s anticruelty laws. 
The private right -of -action allows citizens to 
bring civil suits to enjoin violations, reap statu- 
tory damages, and collect court costs and attor- 
neys' fees if successful. Massachusetts SPCA of- 
ficers are commissioned as special State police 
officers and given training by the police academy 
and the Massachusetts SPCA. They have arrest 
and prosecution authority for violations. Inspec- 
tions are conducted when a problem becomes ap- 
parent. The officers can use selective enforcement 
procedures that focus on serious violations, which 
conserves time, money, and personnel while in- 
creasing the law’s deterrent effect (77). Supporters 
of this model argue that efficient enforcement of 
the type contemplated by it would curtail animal 
abuse, including abuse occurring in laboratories. 
Skeptics point to the obvious increase in cost en- 
tailed by such qualification and training require- 
ments, and they wonder if the research commu- 
nity would accept enforcement of anticruelty 
provisions by its chief antagonists (19). 
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