Ch. 14— State Regulation of Animal Use • 327 
The superior court entered a decision granting 
the company's motion to strike all five counts of 
FOA’s complaint (45). With regard to the alleged 
violation of Connecticut’s anticruelty law, the 
court construed the criminal-penalty law strictly 
and found no evidence of intent to create a pri- 
vate right to enforce its provisions. Although the 
Court did find legislative intent to create a pri- 
vate right to seek injunctive relief against pollu- 
tion; under the Connecticut Environmental Pro- 
tection Act, it rejected FOA's contention that dogs 
were covered by the statute. 
The court also rejected FOA’s charge that U.S. 
Surgical’s destruction of dogs for surgical pur- 
poses constituted a common-law nuisance be- 
cause FOA both “failed to set forth allegations that 
established a public nuisance” and based its claim 
for recovery “upon its peculiar and particular sen- 
sitivities and not upon its rights as a member of 
the general public.” Additionally; the court re- 
jected FOA’s claim that the Federal Animal Wel- 
fare Act created a private right of enforcement 
similar to that created by the Marine Mammal 
Protection Act. Finally; the court agreed with U.S. 
Surgical that FOA could not collect punitive dam- 
ages unless it pleaded and proved that the com- 
pany had shown “a reckless indifference to the 
rights of others or an intentional and wanton vio- 
lation of those rights” (45). 
On December 21, 1982 ; before judgment had 
been entered on the motion to strike, FOA filed 
an amended complaint in Connecticut superior 
court, alleging again that U.S. Surgical’s use of 
dogs for surgical demonstrations was reckless, 
wanton, sometimes without proper anesthetiza- 
tion, and constituted a public nuisance (46). FOA 
also claimed that the company’s use of dogs vio- 
lated a New Jersey anticruelty statute. The revised 
complaint added a new party to the proceedings: 
Pierre Quintana, a resident of Wilton, CT, who 
alleged that his springer spaniel, “George,” was 
"stolen by agents or servants or employees of the 
U.S. Surgical Corporation and converted to said 
owner’s use.” FOA asked for a trial by jury and 
the same relief as earlier. U.S. Surgical, unaware 
that a substitute complaint had been filed, the fol- 
lowing day filed a motion for early entry of judg- 
ment on the motion to strike (47,106). 
While the action in State court continued, FOA 
refiled its case in Federal District Court on De- 
cember 29, 1982, again asserting an interest on 
behalf of its members in "legally sufficient en- 
forcement of the Animal Welfare Act” (48). Reiter- 
ating the allegations of the company’s use of dogs 
in 1981, FOA renewed its contention that proper 
anesthetics were not used. It further alleged that 
U.S. Surgical had purchased live dogs from un- 
licensed dealers, in violation of the act, and that 
the company’s surgery on live animals did not 
constitute experimentation and/or research as 
permitted by the act and was performed with 
“reckless indifference to the lives and well-being” 
of the animals. 
Almost 4 months later, FOA moved for leave 
to amend the renewed complaint, and the motion 
was granted (49). In its amended complaint, filed 
on April 13, 1983, FOA charged that Rudolph 
Varana, a federally licensed animal dealer doing 
business as Varana Rabbit Farms, had committed 
“criminal acts”— i.e., received a stolen golden 
retriever, for which he was convicted under New 
Jersey Law— “as agent and servant for the U.S. 
Surgical Corporation ... in direct violation of 7 
U.S.C. 2131(3) which states that one of the pur- 
poses of the Animal Welfare Act is 'to protect the 
owners of animals from the theft of their animals 
by preventing the sale or use of animals which 
have been stolen’.” FOA contended that the com- 
pany knew or should have known of "its agent” 
Varana’s “criminal acts” but continued to pur- 
chase dogs from him. As a result of Varana's 
"criminal acts” and U.S. Surgical’s own negligence, 
FOA claimed that it had "been required to expend 
substantial amounts of money, [had] diverted sub- 
stantial corporate resources, and [had] been 
forced to restructure [its] activities in order to in- 
vestigate the criminal activities of said Rudolph 
Varana . . . and address the violations of the Ani- 
mal Welfare Act and regulations enacted thereof 
[sic] by the U.S. Surgical Corporation.” (FOA did 
not state that the golden retriever had been ac- 
quired and used by U.S. Surgical.) 
Meanwhile, the company filed a request to re- 
vise the substituted complaint in the State court 
action, asserting that the second count of the sub- 
stituted complaint reiterated allegations of pub- 
