10 
from observation, they have a real existence and practical appli- 
cation as laws of the human mind, independently of any metaphy- 
sical theory, or of the truth or falsehood of any metaphysical 
Speculations Whatever; Let it even be granted that the mind is 
but a succession of states of consciousness, a series of fleeting 
impressions uncaused from without or from within, emerging 
out of nothing and returning into nothing again — still, asldvts 
succession, or, at least, of a past succession, the results to which 
observation had led would remain true. They would require to 
be interpreted into a language from whose vocabulary all such 
terms as cause and effect, operation and Subject, substance and 
attribute, had been banished ; but they Would' still be valid as 
scientific truths, # and valid alike for the idealist and the sceptic. 
They are valid* Whether the sbhsbs actually present external 
bbjects to the understanding, or whether they merely represent 
to the understanding, as present external objects, what are, in 
reality, only modifications of the mind itself; 
fi. According to Boole there exist in oui 4 nature faculties 
which enable us to ascend from the particular facts of experience 
to the general propositions which fornl the basis of science ; as 
well as faculties whose office it is to denudes from general pro- 
positions accepted as true the particular conclusions which they 
involve. The phrase instinctive belief in the permanence of 
sequences or, shortly, belief in uniformity, may serve to recall 
to our notice the former faculties, while the word understanding 
may be taken to include the latter, namely, the logical, faculties. 
The above faculties are subject in their operations to laws 
capable of precise scientific expression, but invested with an 
authority which, as contrasted with the authority of the laws of 
nature, is distinct, sui generis , and underived. Further, there is a 
fitness between this mental procedure and the conditions of our 
environment — viz , such conditions as the existence of species con- 
nected by general resemblances, of facts associated under general 
laws ; together with the union of permanency with order. W ere 
this correspondence between the forms of thought and the actual 
constitution of nature proved to exist, whatsoever connection or 
relation it might be supposed to establish between the two 
systems, it would in no degree affect the question of their mutual 
independence. It would in no sense lead to the consequence 
that the one system is the 'product of the other. 
6. These faculties operate on the subject-matter of know- 
ledge. That subject-matter is obtained through other faculties. 
Certain objects are presented to us, or represented as present, 
by our Senses ; others again are represented before us by our 
Memory or Imagination. But what are we to say of space and 
time ? Boole observes that we have no warrant for resolving 
* “ An Investigation of the Laws of Thought,” &c., by Greorge Boole, 
London, 1854. See chap, iii., arts. 1 and 2., p.p. 39 to 41. In verification of 
the next four paragraphs of this address see Boole, chap, xxii., art. 9, p. 420, 
and art. 8, p. 418 ; next, see art. 6, p.p, 404 to 406 ; next, see art. 8, p.p. 
418 419. 
