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the chance for the former is equal to 44°°°.°.? raifed 
to the fame power, or to .48955 which, being both lefs 
than an equal chance, proves what I have faid. But 
though it would be thus improbable that it had above 
1.600.000 times more or lejs than 1.400,000 times 
more of thefe fides than of all others, it by no means 
follows that we have any reafon for judging that the 
true proportion in this cafe lies fomewhere between 
that of 1. 600, coo to one and 1.400,000 to one. 
For he that will take the pains to make the calcula- 
tion will find that there is nearly the probability ex- 
prefted by .52 7, or but little more than an equal 
chance, that it lies fomewhere between that of 
600.000 to one and three millions to one. It may 
deferve to be added, that it is more probable that this 
proportion lies fomewhere between that of 900,000 
to 1 and 1.900,000 to 1 than between any other 
two proportions whofe antecedents are to one another 
as 900,000 to 1.900,000, and confequents unity. 
I have made thefe obfervations chiefly becaufe they 
are all ftridtly applicable to the events and appear- 
ances of nature. Antecedently to all experience, it 
would be improbable as infinite to one, that any par- 
ticular event, before-hand imagined, fhould follow 
the application of any one natural objedt to another 5 
becaufe there would be an equal chance for anv one of 
a-n infinity of other events. But if we had once feen 
any particular effects, as the burning of wood on 
putting it into fire, or the falling of a done on de- 
taching it from all contiguous objedts, then the con- 
clufions to be drawn from any number of fubfequent 
events of the fame kind would be to be determined 
in the fame manner with the conclufions jufl: men- 
tioned relating to the conftitution of the folid I have 
fuppofed 
