370 Former and Present State of Ceylon. 
be collected upon one point, except at Columbo, where by far 
the larger proportion of the military establishment was usually 
stationed. This place had also been greatly strengthened by 
the Swiss regiment of De Meuron; but unfortunately for the 
Dutch the term of its services expired at the critical season 
of danger; and by an unaccountable oversight in policy, this 
line body of troops was permitted, on greater advantages beino- 
held out to them, to transfer their services to their most dan- 
gerous enemies, and to co-operate powerfully in the reduction 
of their former masters. 
This military establishment of the Dutch, which rarely ex- 
ceeded five thousand men in all, was found sufficient to repel 
the attacks of the native Princes. It was also capable, from tiie 
nature of the country, of completely baffling the attempts of 
any European force that did not much exceed in number the 
troops stationed at any particular point. But it is evident, from 
the sreat extent of the island, that this small force was oblioed 
to be too scattered, to be capable of making any effectual re- 
sistance against a numerous enemy. When the depth of water on 
the eastern shore is considered, as well as the facility afforded 
for landing by the spacious harbour of Triiicomalee, it is im- 
possible that a sufficient number of troops for the defence of this 
quarter could have been spared from the protection of the rich 
countries, on the south-west, which were menaced by an enemy 
ready to make a descent from the coast immediately opposite. 
The difficulty of communication likewise requires the force em- 
ployed to be the greater, as it is next to impossible to march 
troops from one side of the island to the other, in time to 
render each other any effectual support. 
But it is not the defence of the island itself alone that 
