PHILOSOPHY AND “ EVOLUTION ” : AN INQUIRY. 
135 
“ to observe every the least difference that is in things, argues a 
quick and clear sight, and this keeps the understanding steady and 
right in its way to knowledge”; and “an aptness to jumble things 
together wherein can be found any likeness is a fault in the under- 
standing . . . which will not fail to mislead it, and by thus lumping 
of things hinder the mind from distinct and accurate conceptions.” 
The first of philosophical interests is Truth . — The first of 
philosophical interests is Truth, and (to quote Sir Michael 
Foster) :* 
“ the seeker after truth must himself be truthful, truthful with the 
truthfulness of nature. For the truthfulness of nature is not wholly 
the same as that Avhich man sometimes calls truthfulness. It is far 
more imperious, far more exacting . . . It is not her way to 
call the same two things which differ, though the difference may be 
measured by less than the thousandth of a milligramme, or of a 
millimetre, or by any other like standard of minuteness. And the 
man who, carrying the ways of the world into the domain of 
science,” or we may add, of philosophy, “ thinks that he may treat 
nature’s differences in any other way than she treats them herself, 
will find that she resents his conduct.”! 
That, for some time to come, “ Evolution ” may receive support 
from able and influential votaries, and consequently continue 
to delude minds unaccustomed to the estimation of evidence, 
the unwary, the ignorant, and the many who, too indolent or 
too tired to think for themselves, rely upon the confident 
assertions of certain “authorities,” is possible and probable. 
History teaches that it is no new tiling for unsound theories to 
be advocated by eminent partisans. Mil 4 has observed that 
“ a fundamental error is seldom expelled from philosophy .by a 
single victory. It retreats slowly, defends every inch of ground, 
and often, after it has been driven from the open country, retains a 
footing in some remote fastness.” 
The theory of “Evolution” has failed to justify itself to 
Science. Is it more successful with regard to Philosophy ? 
Being a theory which lias for its chief features imaginativeness 
and hazy pretentiousness, a theory which, failing to sub- 
stantiate its claim to be either a science or a philosophy, 
conflicts with the facts of nature and our primary intuitions, it 
cannot ultimately enlist the belief, as it cannot command the 
convictions, of thoughtful and truth-loving men. 
* See his Address as President of the British Association, 1899. 
t Nature , September 14th, 1899. 
! Logic , vol. i, p. 125. 
K 
