38 
Ordinary Meeting, March 23rd, 1858. 
W. Fairbairn, F.R.S., &c.. President, in the Chair. 
A paper was read by the Rev. T. P. Kirkman, M.A., 
F.R.S., “ On the absurdity of Ontology, and the vanity of 
Metaphysical Demonstrations ; illustrated by reference to 
Professor Fender’s Institutes of Metaphysic.” 
Touching the first topic he contented himself for the present 
with asking, whether the word Ontology does not, even in 
its definition, imply a contradiction ? According to its strict 
meaning, the doctrine of Being, pure and absolute Being, as 
independent of Knowing, it is supposed to give correct answers 
to questions about such Being, as it is in itself, whether known 
or not by our faculties. Now every doctrine must consist of 
propositions, and these must, if they are intelligible, state 
something known by our faculties. How then can there be a 
purely ontological proposition? Is not Ontology something 
like a square circle or a green smell ? Can a proposition lay- 
ing down something that is known, give an account of Being 
as it is in itself whether known or not ? 
Touching the second topic, his own impressions of meta- 
physical demonstration in general amount to this, that it is at 
best but sham demonstration. A science in which every new 
writer professes to lay the first foundation stone, is hardly de- 
serving to be called a scienee. 
Referring to the “ Institutes of Metaphysic” by Professor 
Ferriers, which pretends to be a demonstrated theory of Know- 
ing and Being, and to be a metaphysical Euclid, he adverted 
to the ambiguity which runs through the whole of the reasoning 
in the use of the term self, me, ego, sometimes in the singular 
— the me, the ego, as though there were but one ego — at other 
times in the plural — selves, mes, egos. Such a handling of 
terms in a mathematical argument would be condemned as 
illogical, and invalidate all the results. 
ruooT'.r.mNos No, 12. 
