80 
An Essay on the Game of Billiards. 
[March, 
Viz. The first is simply forward: it is produced by the cue only, and analo- 
gous to the motion of the body of a wheel carriage, which preserves a relative posi- 
tion of its parts with the plane whereon it moves ; and may be called the pro- 
gressive. 
The second is forward and rotary : it arises from attrition, by the action of the 
ball, while in progression, against the surface of the table : hence a rotation is pro- 
ducced, analogous to the wheels, which change the relative position of their parts, 
by turning at the same time round their axis — this will be named the attritive 3 .- 
These two motions constitute what may be termed the plain game of Billiards, 
and are always coincident upon the same line ; but there are others also, which 
(if introduced) affect them with various influence, in different directions, modifica- 
tions and degrees ; and these likewise, with their origin and characters, it is now 
endeavoured to discriminate and explain, on physical principles, without the inter- 
vention of Chance — the common enemy of bad players — who are ever intruding 
this unbegotten phantom, between Nature and her operations, to fill up imaginary 
voids, with metaphysical agency ; hoping thus to find, by the subversion of her 
order, some palliation for want of judgment, or deficiency of execution in them- 
selves. 
But let it not be inferred, that it is here intended to expunge the word from the 
player’s vocabulary — far from it — no more is endeavoured, than to have it confined 
within due and reasonable bounds : where it is made to signify only an effect, contrary 
to expectation, or beyond design, it is without objection ; for there it occupies its 
proper place : but when it is used as a cause, originating with itself, an indepen- 
dent and unaccountable principle , the phrase then becomes absurd. Yet in this 
sense it is often used ; and, though intemperate or bad players (as before observ- 
ed) are most sedulous advocates in favour of its existence, and clamorous sup- 
porters of its authority, from a worthless client out of place and notice, it 
(courtier-like) becomes, in power, an ungrateful reprobate ; for they all charge 
it with injustice or ill-natured partiality, insist it rarely does them a friendly of- 
fice, and declare aloud that most of its acts are hostile. 
Chance and Luck are terms nearly synonymous, at least in common use, yet, 
strictly considered, Chance seems to be, in the technicals of logic, the Genus, and 
Luck the Species ; for though the latter frequently has an adjective to qualify its 
meaning, as good, or bad, &c. it is often also without one, and then always taken 
in a good sense. But the quality of Chance, is unintelligible in this last predica- 
ment, and must, therefore, indispensably have an epithet to specify it which being 
sometimes formed from an inflection of the very word with which it ’is compared, 
needless y dianCe ’" the d,stinction at «“« becomes manifest, and further proof 
It may not be amiss to take notice also nf a - . , 
f . rmo . . aJSf b °* a consequence from using those 
terms, either as affections only, annertaininn- „ 8 
’ om >’ appertaining to the persons of particular players, 
or as characters of bemgs that have a separate and independent existence but 
whteh, considered abstractedly, would be perhaps denied. This will appear in such 
Iwf M exemplifytheir comparative meaning) as « he has so 
much Luck, (,. e. good Luck) and I have so little, that there is not a fair Chanck, 
(i. e. s.,nple accidence) m play.ng with him.” If Luck then exists, it must be in 
This word (not sanctioned by the dictionaries! »|, 0 a. . . 
attrition, aud termination “ u | , “ r ™.tures to form from 
‘"S' better than any single one of established use whdst’it T™* “T 
periphrasis, which frequently repeated Would be’ into emble 
