1831.] 
On Political Economy . 
249 
rior to the cost of obtaining 1 them,’* and if such should be the meaning, still less 
can I conceive why it should be so strangely obscured in the expression. But, to 
return to the point ; after the above statement, he goes on, “ Value then is not, strict- 
ly speaking, a quality existing in any substance, but it is an affection of the mind 
of man.” Should this be true, he has certainly found out something new, for it is 
what I venture to say, never entered into the head of any one before, and I con- 
gratulate him on his discovery; but I have to submit to him whether, in such a 
case, the discussion on it is not rather within the province of writers on the hu- 
man mind, and altogether foreign to Political Economy. For my own part, I con- 
fess I should as soon have thought of haif-a-crown, or a yard measure, being an 
affection of the mind. However, in his next paragraph, he informs us, that 
“ although metaphysically treated, there be no such quality in bodies as value ; still 
as there must ever arise a perception of value, in connection with certain bodies 
on which man’s existence is dependent ; it may not, in ordinary discourse, lead to 
error to treat of the inevitable concomitant, as if it really existed in that, with 
which it is ever found conjoined.” It is to be presumed, that his meaning here is, 
that “ the preception of value” is what exists in the mind, which, we need hardly 
observe, is a very different thing from the value itself existing there. He next 
proposes to treat of this inevitable concomitant, “ as if inhering in the class of 
bodies already pointed out and having thus affixed a meaning of his own to the 
term value, he draws his conclusions from it, which “ are directly opposed to all 
existing theories on the subject,” that “ in place of labour being the cause of the 
existence of the value, it is the previous existence of value which is the origi- 
nal cause of the exhibition of labour.” As this conclusion entirely depends on 
the peculiar meaning he has given to the word value, we must now turn to his 
defence of his meaning in a further number, (Gleanings, No. 26.) 
He seems not to be aware that it is usual among men, when reasoning on any 
subject, to agree to make use of certain terms, which are often recuriing, in but 
one sense, purposely to obviate the inconvenience of having different conclusions 
drawn from the same premises, which might be the case, if any term in those pre- 
mises were used in two different senses ; that these terms are often defined, and 
where they are not, it is the custom to reject all secondary and metaphorical mean- 
ings, and to make use of the words in their original and proper senses. Now, as 
what is useful and desirable, is often also valuable, it happens that one of the 
secondary meanings of the word ‘ valuable,’ is ‘ desirable, or useful, and things 
that are desirable are said * to be of value’ or ‘ to have value.’ Having used the 
word in this sense, he turns to Crabb's Synonymes, a work of no authoiity what- 
CTer > justifies himself by a poetical quotation, where * life’ is said to have ‘ no 
value,’ meaning, that it is not desirable. But he is bound in discussions of this kind 
to make use of terms in their strict and proper meanings, unless the contrary be 
expressly agreed upon ; for there would be no end to the confusion produced, if 
ev «y man were entitled to choose his own meaning for the same word, and then 
to draw conclusions from it. The question, therefore, for us is, what is the proper 
meaning of the word ‘ value?’ It appears to be a translation of the Latin woid 
Valor > and to be synonymous with ‘ price,’ ‘ worth.’ So far Johnson s Dictionary 
tells us, but we have another method of ascertaining the true meaning of a word, 
a ml that is, by comparing it with its derivatives. Thus from value, we ave 
‘ valuable,’ and ‘ to value.’ Taking the first of these, we may assert of any thing 
valuable that it « has a value,’ or can be valued. Now as the writer tells us, that 
a ' r > water, and sunshine, are valuable, let him set three cups, one filled with each, 
before him ; let him value, or appraise the contents of each cup ; let him name 
