236 
On Value . 
[Aug. 
Against the original and independent existence of value in this primary de- 
scription of wealth, it may be urged, that as the acuteness of the perception of its 
value must depend on the necessities of the percipients ; the quality, in place 
of being inherent and permanent, is, on the contrary, accidental and transitory ; 
the same substance being at one time valuable, and at another time scarcely 
entitled to the name. 
But while man, taken collectively, is under the influence of the procreative facul- 
ty, and placed on a surface of limited extent ; of which extent but little is found 
spontaneously to yield human nutriment ; and while hunger must be of continual 
recurrence, it will not, I apprehend, be denied, that the disposition to perceive 
and admit the virtual existence of value in food, may be counted on as a fixed 
principle ; on the continued influence of which we may safely reason. 
To the existence then, in any substance, of this appreciable value, which it is 
our province to study ; it is essential, first, that value should, in itself, virtu- 
ally inhere in that substance ; and secondly, that the disposition should exist 
to make specific sacrifices of labour for its possession. 
As the value which is here specified, must positively and independently ex- 
ist in items of wealth ; it behoves me to dispute the arguments which have ge- 
nerally been advanced against the existence of real or positive value ; and in 
so doing, I will first fix the attention upon a consideration sufficiently obvious; 
but which appears, most unaccountably, to have been heretofore overlooked. 
It is this ; that unless value positively exist in each of any two or more 
bodies, it is quite impossible, that the relations of the value inhering in each, can 
be a subject of perception, or of appreciation; or can ever influence the will 
and conduct of man. I maintain, that to the existence of relative value, which 
has heretofore been deemed the only value connected with wealth, and which has 
been, in consequence, the only value which political economists have professed to 
discuss ; it is essentially necessary that positive value should pre-exist, indepen- 
dently in every valuable body, of which the relations in ay come to be subsequent- 
ly compared. 
The oversight above remarked lias not been confined to value alone ; but has, by 
these reasoners, been extended to every sensible quality, wherewith bodies are 
imbued. Thus extension, solidity, sweetness, and so forth, have come to be con- 
sidered as only existing in their relative modes; absolute extension, absolute so- 
lidity, &c. being treated as creatures of the imagination, of which we can know 
nothing certainly ; and which are incapable of influencing our volition and con 
duct. 
But I apprehend that the following instance must he allowed as proof, that 
this supposition is not correct. Thus, when a man requires assistance, to enable 
him more readily to obtain that which is beyond bis reach, he naturally looks 
around for some body in which exists solid extension, more particularly in one 
direction ; and the solid extension existing positively, and independently in the 
body which he finds fitted for his purpose, is the object of his perception, and the 
motive for his subsequent actions with regard to it. If there happen to be two or 
more bodies, each possessed of similar extension in a similar degree, it will be a 
matter of indifference to him which he employs ; still, however, the existence of 
absolute extension will induce him to use one, although his choice will have no- 
thing to determine which. If again these different bodies possess this quality in 
different degrees, then the relations of this quality in each will he compared, and 
that body will be selected which is best suited to his purpose. But it is manifest, 
that this latter operation must be subsequent to, and wholly dependent on, the pre- 
existence, independently, and absolutely, of this quality in each of these bodies, 
and that there could be no perception of differences, and no subsequent opera- 
tion of the mind in determining the choice, but for the accidental circumstance 
of this quality being enjoyed in common, although in somewhat different degrees, 
by two or more bodies. 
It is very natural, that the ideas of sensible qualities, most familiar to the 
minds ot men, should be relative; because common qualities are found to ex- 
ist, sometimes in an equal, sometimes in a greater or less degree, in all the dif- 
ferent substances with which we can become acquainted ; and because of the 
consequent necessity under which man must ever labour, of distinguishing 
and identifying, by their respective differences, whatsoever objects are present- 
ed to him. 
But it must, notwithstanding this, be remembered, that the ideas of exten- 
sion, solidity, color, taste, and so forth, when suggested to man, by bodies 
ca ciliated to give rise to these sensations, are original, simple, and independent 
