IS 
The Right Hon. and Rev. the Lord O’Neill, in moving the lirst resolu- 
tion, — “ That the Report of the Council now read be received and adopted, 
and circulated amongst the Members and Associates,” said, — My Lord 
President, Ladies and Gentlemen. Although I have not been in very fre- 
quent attendance at the meetings of this Institute, I have watched with 
some interest its published proceedings, and especially those which touch upon 
the relation between physical science and religion. The publications which 
from time to time are put out by the Society appear to me to be most valuable, 
indeed, I think their value cannot be overrated. The Report, at least in a 
note, alludes particularly to a paper which was read* some time ago by Bishop 
Cotterill, which went to the root of the relations between “ Scientific 
thought and Religious belief.” The Bishop supports two main propositions 
in his paper. The first is, that the conclusions of physical science do not 
possess that mathematical certainty which is sometimes attributed to them, 
and which is supposed to entitle them to raise their voice against religion. 
The second is, that there is no truth in the assertion, which is often so 
confidently made, that the regular sequence of physical phenomena excludes 
the possibility of spontaneity or will being exercised. With regard to 
the first of these it is to be observed that physical conclusions, even when 
arrived at by mathematical calculation, do not possess mathematical certainty, 
because they must be proved from hypotheses which lie beyond the region 
of mathematics. To take a simple example, trigonometry enables us to 
say with great certainty that if a tower standing at a certain distance 
subtends a certain angle at the eye, its height will be so many feet ; but 
the data on which this calculation is founded, viz., the distance of the 
tower and the magnitude of the subtended angle, arc ascertained, not by 
mathematical calculation, but by a different process, measurement. In a 
similar manner all the conclusions of physical science are dependent, when 
derived by mathematical calculation, upon hypotheses which are not them- 
selves in the region of mathematics, and therefore cannot be said to 
possess mathematical certainty. Again, w*hen the conclusion derived from a 
given hypothesis is found to be in accordance with experience we cannot 
pronounce it to be certain, because, unless we can not only reason down from 
the hypothesis to the conclusion, but up from the conclusion to the hypo- 
thesis and show that no other hypothesis will account for it, we have no 
right to presume upon its certainty. In the second position of Bishop Cotterill 
he combats the assertion that there is no room for spontaneity or will in the 
sequence of nature’s phenomena. The Bishop observes that both science 
and religion — including under the term “ science” the theory of evolution- 
point to a time when the world was without form, on which, taking Mr. 
Herbert Spenser’s view that the universe was at one time homogeneous, 
he reasons in the following manner. He says the universe was at this time 
either infinite or finite ; if it was infinite, all the particles of which it is com- 
posed being endowed with similar powers must be acted upon by equal and 
opposite forces ; equilibrium would by that means be maintained, and it is im- 
possible that any change could occur. If, on the other hand, it was finite, the 
