148 
sensation, not auditory ideation. All our senses together do 
not give us ideation. The paper, however, admits that idea 
belongs to the mind, not to the organs of sense, when it says, 
“ an idea in the mind, which we desire to retain, is kept there 
by the restraining influence which, through those higher 
centres, we can exert upon the other centres."”* 
Consciousness. 
The Professor uses the term “ consciousness ” in a manner 
tending to give us an incorrect view of brain as the organ 
of mind. He speaks of “ attentive t ideation by which 
consciousness is kept concentrated on certain phenomena,” 
where he uses “ consciousness ” instead of “ mind,” for attention 
is just the mind concentrated on certain phenomena. And 
he speaks of “the brain as the organ of consciousness,” 
where he uses ee consciousness” instead of “ sensation.” This, 
however, is not to be wondered at, as, on the same page, 
he uses the phrase “ sensation or consciousness,” making 
sensation and consciousness synonymous. 
“ Consciousness;]; is applied to every state of mind to re- 
present it during its continuance, merely as a feeling. It 
denotes the mind’s capability of knowing each of its states ; 
and it refers exclusively to what is in the mind itself.” 
The paper speaks of “our states of consciousness, actual 
and potential, in the cerebral cortex ” ; but our states of 
consciousness are states of mind, and in the mind, not states 
of matter, and in the cerebral cortex. It also speaks of 
“ continuous^ registration of our conscious experience in 
the cerebral cortex ; ” but conscious experience, or consci- 
ousness, is mental, and cannot be registered in the cortex. 
It also says, “ impressions || on sensory nerves do not affect 
consciousness merely as facts, but have certain qualities which 
express themselves subjectively as feelings.” Impressions on 
the sensory nerves, however, give us sensations and nothing 
else. 
It has been said that, te some^f change in the condition of 
the matter of the brain is the invariable antecedent of each 
sensation, thought, and emotion,” and our author says, “ all 
consciousness** implies cerebral activity ” ; and Allman says, 
“ whenff a thought passes through the mind it is associated 
* Page 123. t Pages 113, 122. J Cairns’s Logic, p. 8. 
§ Page 124. || Page 121. 
Huxley, Fortnightly Beview, vol. xvi., p. 557. 
** Page 113. ft Sheffield Address. 
