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in consequence of some common character that is either 
intrinsic or extrinsic Are the virtues classed as 
such because of some intrinsic community of nature ? Then 
there must be identifiable a common trait in all the cardinal 
virtues which Aristotle specifies — Courage, Temperance, 
Liberality, Magnanimity, Meekness, Amiability or Friend- 
liness, Truthfulness, Justice. What, now, is the trait pos- 
sessed in common by Magnificence and Meekness ? and if 
any such trait can be disentangled, is it that which consti- 
tutes the essential trait in Truthfulness ? The answer must 
be — No.” Now, it would be perfectly competent to Mr. 
Spencer to maintain that this is the true answer ; but it is - 
extraordinary he should make no reference whatever to the * 
fact that it is an essential part of Aristotle's argument to 
specify not merely a common trait, but a common definition in 
all these virtues. Aristotle’s discussion of the nature of virtue is 
one of the most important and elaborate portions of his work, 
and he defines virtue to be a moral habit subsisting in a mean 
relative to ourselves, which is determined by sound reason. 
Thus magnificence is the habit which constitutes the true 
mean in the expenditure of money, between vulgar profusion 
on the one side and meanness on the other. Meekness is the 
mean in reference to the indulgence of anger between undue 
passion and indifference. . Moralists have differed in their 
opinions respecting the adequacy of this definition of virtue. 
But it is one of the most memorable contributions to moral 
science, and if Aristotle’s opinion was to be discussed, it ought 
not, at all events, to have been ignored. The judgment of so 
acute an observer deserves at least some respect on a subject 
in regard to which he stands in the very first rank of thinkers ; 
and it is perfectly certain that he did class the virtues together 
because he considered them to be marked bv “ an intrinsic 
*/ 
community of character.” That which is to be complained of 
is not that Mr. Spencer differs from Aristotle. If he could 
supersede him, so much the better. But we have a right to 
expect that in treating such a subject, for such a purpose, he 
would at least attend to what Aristotle says, instead of partly 
ignoring and partly misrepresenting it. 
6. It seemed desirable to draw attention at the outset to this 
instance of inaccurate statement and argument, because it is 
intimately connected with one remarkable instance of falla- 
cious reasoning on which, in great measure, the whole of Mr. 
Spencer’s argument turns. One of the first questions with, 
which a moralist has to deal is the meaning of the distinction 
between good and bad, right and wrong ; and Mr. Spencer’s 
third chapter discusses (C good and bad conduct.” He con- 
