161 
taneously achieves the greatest totality of life in self, in off- 
spring, and in fellow men” (p. 26); and this, in accordance with 
the illustrations just given, he concludes to be good conduct. 
He next observes that this judgment upon conduct involves an 
affirmative answer to the question, Is life worth living ? “ On 
the answer to this question,” he says, “ depends entirely every 
decision on the goodness and badness of conduct” (p. 26). Of 
course, this is only true on the assumption just made, that 
conduct is gooff or bad according as it increases or diminishes 
the sum total of life. But allowing this to pass for the mo- 
ment, let us follow Mr. Spencer further. He proceeds to 
inquire on what ground the question of the desirableness of 
promoting life is practically determined; and he concludes 
that all arguments on the subject “assume it to be self-evident 
that life is good or bad, according as it does, or does not, bring 
a surplus of agreeable feeling.” That which is implied in all 
views “is, that conduct should conduce to preservation of the 
individual, of the family, and of society, only supposing that 
life brings more happiness than misery. Changing the venue 
cannot alter the verdict. If either the pessimist, while saying 
that the pains of life predominate, or the optimist, while 
saying that the pleasures predominate, urge that the pains 
borne here are to be compensated by pleasures received here- 
after, and that so life, whether or not justified in its imme- 
diate results, is justified in its ultimate results, the implication 
remains the same. The decision is still reached by balancing 
pleasures against pains Thus there is no escape from 
the admission that in calling good the conduct which sub- 
serves life, and bad the conduct which hinders or destroys it, 
and in so implying that life is a blessing and not a curse, we 
are inevitably asserting that conduct is good or bad according 
as its total effects are pleasurable or painful ” (p. 28). “ One 
theory only,” he affirms, “is imaginable, in pursuance of which 
other interpretations of good and bad can be given. This 
theory is that men were created with the intention that they 
should be sources of misery to themselves ; and that they are 
bound to continue living that their Creator may have the satis- 
faction of contemplating their misery ” (p. 28) . Omitting people 
of this class “ as beyond or beneath argument,” Mr. Spencer 
finds that all others avowedly or tacitly hold that the final 
justification for maintaining life can only be the reception 
from it of a surplus of pleasurable feeling over painful feeling ; 
and that goodness or badness can be ascribed to acts which 
subserve life or hinder life only on this supposition. He con- 
cludes, therefore, that “ if we call good every kind of conduct 
which aids the lives of others, and do this under the belief 
