163 
the apparent reasoning by which it is reached is a mere sophism. 
The fact alleged is that we should not consider an act bad 
unless it entailed pain. It certainly does not follow that we 
call it bad “ solely for the reason that it entails pain.” Be- 
cause a certain result is the property of an action, it does not 
follow that it is its only property ; nor even that it is its prin- 
cipal property. Even if it be allowed that the pain resulting 
from evil actions is one reason why we call them bad, there is an 
extreme recklessnessof assumption in jumping to the conclusion 
that this is the only reason. Mr. Spencer cannot consistently 
contend that there are no characteristic qualities in morally good 
actions except that they tend to pleasure. He himself, as we 
shall subsequently have occasion to observe, recognises that 
justice is a valuable practical test of actions (p. 164). If so, 
it follows that badness may be confidently ascribed to an action 
because it is unjust. It must be observed, however, that Mr. 
Spencer leaves himself no escape from this fallacy. He goes on 
to say, that, “using as our tests these most pronounced forms of 
good and bad conduct, we find it unquestionable that our ideas of 
their goodness and badness really originate from our conscious- 
ness of the certainty or probability that they will produce 
pleasures or pains somewhere.” Giving the utmost latitude 
to his argument, what does it prove about the origination of 
these ideas ? He maintains by a very elaborate method that 
goodness must lead to pleasure somewhere and somehow. 
“ Pleasure somewhere, at some time, to some being or beings, 
is an inexpugnable element of the conception/’ Granting 
that this may be ultimately involved in the conception, it is a 
very different thing to assume that it was its origin, and its 
sole origin. Even, in a word, if the conclusion were right 
the premises would not carry it. If such a piece of reasoning- 
on such a subject were encountered in a writer of less reputa- 
tion than Mr. Herbert Spencer, we should be justified in at 
once laying down the volume. On questions which deal with 
the complex and delicate organization of the highest part of 
human nature, accurate statement and strictly logical reason- 
ing are more than usually requisite; and if we find these 
qualifications disregarded at the very threshold of the subject, 
we may well lose all confidence in the sequel.. 
9. The point Mr. Spencer has omitted to notice is indicated 
by a hasty observation of his own in the passage, already 
noticed, which refers to Aristotle. “If,” he says, “virtue is 
primordial and independent, no reason can be given why there 
should be any correspondence between virtuous conduct and 
conduct that is pleasure- giving in its total effects on self, or 
others, or both; and if there is not any necessary corre- 
