164 
spondence, it is conceivable that the conduct classed as virtuous 
should be pain-giving in its total effects” (p. 37). It would 
seem peculiarly strange that such a remark should be made 
by an evolutionist. One of the most interesting features in 
Mr. Spencer’s book is his description of the manner in which, 
as life becomes more and more developed, the different func- 
tions of our nature, physical, biological, psychological, and 
sociological, each attain their best development. As he ex- 
presses it, the “ physiological rhythms” become more regular 
as well as more various in their kinds as organization advances. 
Activities are fulfilled “ in the spontaneous exercise of duly- 
proportioned faculties.” If this be the case, and the implications 
of the theory of evolution lead Mr. Spencer to lay great stress 
on it, the perfection of the individual faculties, their harmo- 
nious and pleasurable exertion, is necessarily in correspondence 
with the final result attained in the complete development 
of the whole social system. In fact, though ho ignores it, 
he sometimes approaches closely to Aristotle’s statement, 
that happiness is an energy in accordance with the most per- 
fect action of our faculties. If, therefore, in any case, it 
be immediately discernible what is the right action of a given 
faculty, we may know, without going any further, that this is 
conducive to the ultimate happiness of mankind. To take an 
obvious example : it is a matter wholly independent of theor 
respecting the universe, of religion or of evolution hypotheses, 
that the virtue of one part of the intellect is to argue according 
to the rules of the syllogism, and to calculate in accordance 
with the multiplication table. If then a man maintains that 
twice two are five, or if Mr. Spencer mistakes a logical Genu* 
for a property, can we allow that we have no reason to call 
the respective procedures bad except that they have painful 
consequences? They are wrong in themselves. There is 
something “ primordial and independent” in the badness of 
a false syllogism ; and the reason to be given for the ultimate 
correspondence between good reasoning and good conduct 
is, that, according to Mr. Spencer’s own hypothesis, all things 
are indissolubly bound up together ; so that an error in one 
entails an error in all. Now, if we are thus capable of detect- 
ing an intellectual error, without reference to its ultimate 
consequences, why not a moral error ? If we are capable of 
detecting a false argument, in itself and as it stands, why 
should we not be capable of similarly detecting a wrong act in 
morals ? In a word, if nature be one, there is evident reason 
why all parts of it should be in harmony, and why a defect in 
a part should necessarily entail defect in the whole. 
1.0. Mr. Spencer’s argument appears, in short, vitiated from 
