166 
and which, to say the least, relegates to the background 
the moral conceptions which have been most potent in the 
loftiest teachers and the noblest races of men. A few 
passages in Mr. Spencer’s book offer a passing explanation, 
on the basis of the evolution theory, of the origin of our 
conceptions of duty, and of moral obligations. Hut these 
conceptions are treated as merely temporary stages in the 
development of conduct ; and it is expressly argued that they 
will disappear. They are described as abstract conceptions, 
due in the first instance to accumulated experiences of the 
advantage of controlling the feelings which prompt to imme- 
diate gratification by feelings which refer to remoter results; 
while the element of coerciveness has been introduced by expe- 
rience of the various forms of restraint — political, social, and 
religious — which have enforced the authority of these remoter 
and more complex feelings. But as men become more completely 
adapted to the social state, they will appreciate more clearly the 
evil consequences which bad acts naturally produce, and the 
advantageous consequences which good acts naturally produce. 
This is the only really moral motive (pp. 120-1), and as it 
becomes distinct and predominant, it loses the associated 
consciousness of subjection to some external agency — or in 
other words “ the feeling of obligation fades” (p. 127). This 
leads to “ the tacit conclusion ” which, as Mr. Spencer says, 
“ will be to most very startling, that the sense of duty or moral 
obligation is transitory, and will diminish as fast as moralisa- 
tion increases ” (p. 127). Under such a view moral obligation, 
which has been hitherto deemed the cardinal principle in 
Ethics, becomes a mere accident of them. It is neither their 
beginning nor their end. It arises as a temporary illusion in 
the process of their development, and the highest attainment 
of man’s moral nature is to live in the simple satisfaction of 
sound impulses without realising that he is subject to a con- 
trolling power or is conforming to the will of a lawful authority. 
Mr. Spencer admits that this will be to most “a very startling 
conclusion.” It involves, indeed, a denial that conscience is 
a permanent faculty in our nature ; for if it be, there must 
always be a pleasure in the consciousness of satisfying it. A 
conclusion which involves this result appears so complete a 
paradox that it may safely be left to confute itself and to 
discredit the argument which leads to it. 
12. It seemed desirable to insist on these errors in Mr. 
Spencer’s fundamental conceptions and reasonings, because 
in a discussion of this kind everything turns upon them. We 
shall now, moreover, be in a better position to estimate the 
value of the general system which the author propounds. 
