167 
He starts from the principle that, as the part cannot be com- 
pletely understood without a knowledge of the whole, it is 
necessary, for the purpose of Ethics, to study human conduct 
as a part of the larger whole constituted by the conduct of 
animate beings in general. It is not easy to see why this 
should be necessary. It might as well be argued that we 
cannot have a science of astronomy without a comprehension 
of the whole system of the stellar universe. All our sciences 
have grown up from a careful observation of facts on a small 
scale and in details, and have been gradually extended from 
point to point, and from the smaller to the larger generalisa- 
tions. Of course we can never “fully understand” the part 
until we understand the whole ; but if men of science had 
commenced their researches into natural philosophy with a 
general theory of the constitution of nature, they would never 
have made their present advances. In point of fact, this is 
what they did attempt in the days before the inductive philo- 
sophy ; and Bacon’s great work was to recall them from these 
vain speculations to a patient observation of the simple facts 
at their feet. Accordingly, it has been justly observed by a 
German critic of Mr. Spencer’s work, that it is really a retro- 
gression to the old metaphysical methods.* It is probably, 
indeed, this attempt to construct a complete scheme of the 
universe which constitutes the attraction of writers of this 
school. Every age — every leading school of thought has 
produced its systematizer, and the modern representatives of 
the inductive philosophy are as prone as the schoolmen to 
assume certain absolute principles as their starting-point, and 
to cut down all the facts of life so as to fit their bed of 
Procrustes. 
13. Professor Calderwood has, however, pointed out forcibly 
in the Contemporary Review for January, that in order to 
render the evolution theory applicable to moral life, Mr. 
Spencer has been compelled to modify the hypothesis in 
a degree which, as implied in an expression used by the 
author himself, amounts to a complete reversal of it. The 
operative principle of evolution up to the point at which 
human conduct begins is “ the struggle for existence” between 
members of the same species and members of different 
species ; and “ very generally,” as Mr. Spencer philosophically 
puts it, “ a successful adjustment made by one creature 
involves an unsuccessful adjustment made by another creature, 
either of the same kind or of a different kind” (p. 17). That 
* Schurers Theologische Literatu-Zeitung, 27 March, 1880. 
