169 
a total result, its relation to a future life, if there be one, is a 
momentous element in the case. But throughout the subse- 
quent argument this consideration is entirely omitted. The 
“ life,” by the pleasures of which Mr. Spencer estimates good- 
ness and badness, is that of human beings living in society in 
this world. The bearings of acts on a future state are not for 
a moment taken into account. Now, undoubtedly, on ordinary 
theories, it is possible for very important moral conclusions to 
be drawn without reference to a future life. One who recog- 
nises that virtue has those primordial and independent” cha- 
racteristics which Mr. Spencer denies to it, may reach very 
trustworthy Data of Ethics , as has in great measure been shown' 
by Butler, from a simple consideration of the constitution of 
human nature as we find it here. But if a philosopher starts 
from the supposition that we must contemplate life as a whole 
in order to estimate the fitness of conduct in parts ; and that 
the sole test of good and bad, right and wrong, is whether 
their “ aggregate results to self and others are pleasurable or 
painful,” it is absolutely imperative that he should take into 
account the whole of life, whether here or hereafter, unless he 
can show that there is no continuity whatever between the two 
states of existence. Mr. Spencer chooses to seek his ethical 
data in a certain theory of existence in general. That being 
his position, he has no right to assume, without a word of 
justification, that a future life for men forms no practical part 
of such existence. If a Christian moralist were to commence 
by assuming a future state of rewards and punishments as the 
basis of his system, he would probably be denounced by 
Mr. Spencer as commencing with an arbitrary hypothesis. 
But a negative hypothesis on this subject is just as arbitrary 
as a positive one. Mr. Spencer has not got rid of dogma. 
He has only substituted the dogmas of the evolution hypo- 
thesis respecting life in this world for the dogmas of theology 
respecting life in this world and the next. 
15. It might be anticipated that Data of Ethics of this 
vague, arbitrary, and unethical character would furnish no very 
satisfactory guidance, and would go but a very little way 
towards filling that “ vacuum” which Mr. Herbert Spencer 
contemplates with apprehension. Such is the result ; and as 
evidence that it is so an unimpeachable witness can be ad- 
duced. That witness is no other than Mr. Herbert Spencer 
himself. In his ninth chapter, after expounding the main 
elements of his system, after having discussed “ the evolution 
of conduct,” “ good and bad conduct,” “ the ways of judging 
conduct,” “ the physical view,” “ the biological view,” “ the 
psychological view,” and the “ sociological view,” he proceeds 
VOL. xiv. n 
