180 
REMARKS BY THE REV. PREBENDARY W. J. IRONS, D P. 
Whether the doctrine of Evolution is in accordance with what is to be 
ascertained of the physical universe, is a question of fact which, as Professor 
Wace observes, must be determined by the observations of men of Physical 
Science, and may for the present be left to them. But Evolution in Morals 
may be no more than an expression of that advancement of the perm in 
every conscious agent which is implied in his development nnd education, 
and is acknowledged, in some form, by all who take our present life to l>e 
imperfect in many ways, and so, possibly, a life of probation altogether for a 
higher sphere. Indeed Evolution, whether physical or moral, implies movement 
towards the more perfect ; and it is strange that then* are men of science 
often so deficient in philosophy, as to fail to see that Evolution prcMippo^* 
an ideal towards which it proceeds. Just as an illogical procedure is wrong in 
itself (as Professor Wace points out) quite apart from the “ pain ” which it 
may ultimately occasion, mentally or bodily; so an act of injustice or unfair- 
ness is felt to be absolutely wrong, offends an idea/, in addition to the pain 
it occasions. 
When Mr. Spencer says, an act is called “ had,' “solely for the reason 
that it entails pain,” he does not, of course, mean only bodily pain : but if 
he includes mental pain, then he admits that the conscious being has some 
constitution of his own, the violation of which is distressing. In other 
words, the conscious being is in relation with a previous ideal. It seems to 
me that Mr. Spencer’s analysis always implies an «i priori ; and that there 
is frequently no difficulty in accepting, in modified terms, what he says a* 
matter of fact, reserving altogether the determining principles. I should be 
glad that Mr. Spencer should consider this ; and also consider that his 
notion of finding “ a scientific busis” for first principles involves a contradic- 
tion. What may be called Mr. Spencer’s diagnosis of morals is full of 
interest ; just as Aristotle’s doctrine of the “ mean ” is replete with practical 
reality. But the failure to understand the relation of the conscious being to 
the absolute is the conspicuous defect in both cases. 
A grave error into which Mr. Spencer has fallen is not entirely his. He 
has been led to regard the only antithesis to his view as some system of 
supernatural ethics dependent solely on revelation. Of course there are 
fanatics who conceive that revelation creates the moral nature, instead of 
addressing itself to that nature. But to assail this is to make war with a 
shadow. 
And, finally, with reference to all Mr. Spencer’s moral analysis ; even were 
it admitted to be complete, it is impossible to persuade anyone that human 
action is really determined by analytical considerations. The spring of action 
can never be so found. It must be a previous principle. Even if he should 
