310 
be relied upon, and this is called ee begging the question " ! 
Now the mind is either capable of coming to a true conclusion 
respecting Theism or any other subject or it is not. If it is not, 
farewell to Mill's elaborate reasonings on the matter ; they are 
intrinsically worthless. Thus Samson perishes with, the Phi- 
listines against whom he fights. All conclusions are founded 
on the assumption that we are capable of drawing them. But 
is this a mere assumption ? Are all our mental efforts thus 
valueless ? Certainly not. And why ? Because we have in 
numberless instances found our theories to be absolutely cor- 
rect, i.e.y to be thoroughly supported by and in perfect har- 
mony with objective actuality. The mind has a theory respect- 
ing thirst (it matters not for the present purpose whether it 
be intuitional or acquired), and comes to a true conclusion on 
the subject. Therefore, we need not beg the question by assum- 
ing that the mind can come to a true conclusion, because we 
know as a fact that it does so arrive. It is of opinion that 
thirst can be quenched by certain liquids, and this is the case. 
The mind, therefore, comes before us not even merely as a 
credible witness, but as a witness whose truthfulness and credit 
have been proved a score of times, and whose evidence must 
therefore be received with the greatest respect. Such a wit- 
ness may, it is possible, deceive either wittingly or unwittingly; 
but its testimony appears with a vastly preponderating weight 
of probability in its favour — 95 points out of the 100. Thus 
Mill's argument, if valid, would destroy all reasoning, including 
of course his own ; would even, “ force entangling itself with 
strength,"* destroy itself; for, if the mind can come to no 
sound conclusion, then the proposition that The mind can come 
to no sound conclusion is untenable. Thus the argument from 
general consent emerges from this attack not merely uninjured, 
but strengthened, so far as our belief in it is concerned, by 
being able to resist such an assailant. 
Mill having, as he supposes, routed the argument, would 
fain pursue the flying foe, and asks, “ What ground does the 
general prevalence of the belief in the Deity afford us for in- 
ferring that this belief is native to the human mind, and 
independent of evidence ?” These last words convert the idea 
contained in the question into a truism. No one supposes 
that general beliefs are “ independent of evidence" ; but evi- 
dence arises from circumstances internal or subjective as well 
as from circumstances external or objective. If we omit the 
words italicised we may answer the question by another — 
* Antony and Cleopatra , act iv., scene 12. 
