SCIENCE. 
3i i 
flower shows that all parts have changed, and are 
decidedly leaf-like, though not to the same extent. 
Of the sepals (Fig. 2.) two are larger than the others, are 
very distinctly veined, and have a few small teeth near their 
tips ; the remaining sepals are narrow, elongated, and 
have only the midrib without any lateral veins. The 
petals have lost their papilionaceous character entirely, 
though the vexillum may be recognized by its larger size’ 
Each petal (Figs. 3, 4.) is leaf-like in shape, veining, and 
especially in the possession of a pair of stipules which 
are fused with its base precisely, as are the stipules of 
the leaf proper. The petals project but slightly from the 
tube of the calyx. 
Fig. 3. 
Fig. 4. 
Fig. 5. 
The stamens (Fig. 5.) are not diminished in number, but 
are separate, and each filament bears the stipules distinctly. 
They are joined with it nearly to the anther. This would 
seem to indicate that the sheath of united stamens in the 
Leguminostz is made by the fusion of the stipular 
elements of the leaf alone. 
Within the stamens, and occupying the centre of the 
flower, is a single, rather long-stemmed leaflet, appar- 
ently the middle one of the three so characteristic of the 
trifoliums. It is unmistakably a leaf in its veining, out- 
line, color, etc., and upon its petiolar portions are borne 
— as might be expected — the stipules ; in this case as 
plainly stipules as those which are borne by the true 
foliage leaves. No trace of a pistilline nature is to be 
seen. The reversion has been complete. All the parts, 
except the stamens are exceedingly hairy. 
The^peculiar feature in this case is the retention of the 
stipules as separate parts in all the whorls, excepting the 
calyx, where they are undistinguishably fused to form the 
cup-like portion of that organ. 
The ease with which these reverted flowers can be ob- 
tained and studied, and the light which they throw upon 
the morphology of the parts of the flower make them 
worthy the attention of studen'swho ought, as soon as 
possible, to gain a practical knowledge of the real nature 
of floral parts. 
A demonstration in mathematics could not be more 
conclusive than this lesson from Trifolium pratense, our 
familiar red clover. 
Pennsylvania State College, Dec 20, 1880. 
THE CLASSIFICATION OF SCIENCE. 
By Rev. Samuel Fleming, LL. D., Ph. D. 
I. 
DEFINITIONS. 
The term science has been variously defined. It is 
from the Latin scientia (from scio, I know,) which is 
defined as “ a knowing, or being skilled in anything ; 
generally, knowledge, science,’’ The original sense Of 
the term scientza involves the twofold conception, of the 
thing, or fact itself, which is the subject of knowledge, 
and the knowing the fact. The former is the objective 
signification, the latter the subjective. In defining the 
term, therefore, diverse forms of expression have been 
used, and different senses conveyed. In the edition of 
Webster’s Unabridged Dictionary, published in 1878, 
modified definitions are given as follows : “ Knowledge ; 
the comprehension of truth or fact ; truth ascertained ; 
that which is known; hence, specifically, knowledge duly 
arranged, and referred to general truths on which it is 
founded.” By some, the definition given is “ systematic 
knowledge ” ; by others, “ what is comprehended by the 
mind ” ; another definition is in the following language : 
“ Science is the name for such portions of human know- 
ledge as have been more or less generalized, systematized 
and verified.” Herbert Spencer gives the following, cor- 
responding with the general divisions of his “ Classifica- 
tion of the Sciences”: 1. That which treats of the 
forms in which phenomena are known to us ; 2. That 
which treats of the phenomena themselves. Prof. Tice, 
after stating that “ there is a broad distinction between 
knowledge and science,” gives this distinction in the fol- 
lowing terms : “ Knowledge is a clear and certain per- 
ception of that which exists, or of truth or of fact. Sci- 
ence is a body of general principles: particular truths, 
and facts, arranged in systematic order.” 
The terms science and knowledge have sometimes been 
used as synonymous ; frequently without due discrimina- 
tion. It is evident that the facts of science, if not science 
itself, exist prior to, or irrespective of the mind which ac- 
quires the knowledge of them, if we except the science 
of the mind itself. Existence is one thing, the know- 
ledge of such existence is radically another thing. 
Hence the propriety, and often great importance of 
recognizing this distinction, and of discriminating in the 
use of the terms. Scientific terms should be used with 
definiteness of meaning, for clearness and conciseness of 
written or oral instruction. If science and knowledge 
are synonymous terms, if the definition “ science is 
knowledge ” is the same with the terms transposed, thus 
“ knowledge is science,” every child and uneducated per- 
son who knows that “ fire burns,” is a scientist, without, 
it may be, knowing what fire is, or its causes. Then 
science would signify no more than knowledge. But all 
fundamentally distinctive ideas are appropriately ex- 
pressed by different terms. And it is desirable that the 
demands of language be recognized, and this practical 
rule for the use of discrimniating words be observed. 
Synonymous words are properly those which are derived 
from different languages, and are used for euphony, or 
variety. 
Further, there is a legitimate distinction between com- 
mon, obvious, or non-scientific knowledge, and scientific 
knowledge. And this is not a distinction in respect 
to certainty ; for common knowledge is often as 
certain as scientific knowledge, as in reference to 
the fall of a body to the earth : while much that is 
called scientific knowledge is far from being exact 
in its complete sense, as in respect to the nature 
of the ultimate cosmic forces, the aurora borealis, 
and other phenomena. Nor is it a difference simply in 
degree of knowledge, but a difference also in respect to 
kind and quality. Thus two persons may observe an 
eclipse of the sun or moon ; one may know only that one 
body intercepts the light of another body ; the other per- 
son may know the causes, the sizes, the distances, orbits, 
periodic times, laws of motion, and many other elements 
whose knowledge is essential to the determination of the 
phenomenon. The attainments respectively differ, — the 
former having only the knowledge of a single fact, the 
latter the knowledge of the whole system of facts, prin- 
ciples and laws pertaining to the phenomenon ; the former 
possessing ordinary knowledge, the latter scientific knowl- 
