540 
HEREDITARY INFLUENCE. 
other, are conveniently classed under one term, named 
species ; but this general term has no objective existence ; 
the abstract or typical sheep, apart from all concrete indivi- 
duals, has no existence out of our systems. Whenever an 
individual sheep is born, it is the offspring of two individual 
sheep, whose structures and dispositions it reproduces ; it is 
not the offspring of an abstract idea; it does not come into 
being at the bidding of a Type, which as a Species sits apart, 
regulating ovine phenomena. The facts of dissemblance 
between offspring and parents we shall explain by-and-by ; 
they do not plead in favour of species, because species is a 
figment of philosophy, not a fact. The sooner we disengage 
our zoology from all such lingering remains of old metaphysics 
the better. Nothing but dreary confusion and word-splitting 
can come of our admitting them. Think of the hot and 
unwise controversies respecting “ transmutation of species,” 
which would have been spared if a clear conception of the 
meaning of species had been steadily held before the dis- 
putants, or if the laws which regulate heritage had been duly 
considered. In one sense, transmutation of species is a con- 
tradiction in terms. To ask if one species can produce 
another, i. e ., a cat produce a monkey — is to ask if the off- 
spring do not inherit the organization of their parents. We 
know they do. We cannot conceive it otherwise. But the 
laws of heritage place the dispute in something of a clearer 
light, for they teach us that <£ species” is constant, because 
individuals reproduce individuals closely resembling them, 
which is the meaning of ie species;” and they also teach us, 
that individuals reproduce individuals varying in structure 
from themselves, which varieties, becoming transmitted as 
part and parcel of the parental influence, will, in time, become 
so great as to constitute a difference in species. It is in vain 
that the upholders of “ fixity of species” assert, that all the 
varieties observed are differences of degree only. Differences 
of degree become differences of kind, when the gap is widened : 
ice and steam are only differences of degree, but they are 
equivalent to differences of kind. If, therefore, " transmu- 
tation of species” is absurd, cc fixity of species” is not a whit 
less so. That which does not exist, can neither be transmuted 
nor maintained in fixity. Only individuals exist; they re- 
semble their parents, and they differ from their parents. Out 
of these resemblances we create species, out of these diffe- 
rences we create varieties ; we do so as conveniences of 
classification, and then believe in the reality of our own 
figments. 
(( Les especes,” says Buffon, boldly, " sont les seuls etres 
