20*2 STRAY PAPERS ON VETERINARY JURISPRUDENCE. 
Mr. Goodwin’s letter. The law cannot decide unless the evidence 
is clear and good ; the law cannot decide that a horse is sound 
when the evidence clearly proves him to be unsound. But how 
can a judge and jury decide according to law and the evidence 
brought before them, when as many veterinary surgeons, it is said, 
can be brought up on either side to swear just contrary to the 
other ? Take the case of the grey gelding mentioned by Mr. 
Goodwin. Everybody knows that, if a horse is lame, and can be 
proved to have been lame at the time of sale, he is not only un- 
sound, but is returnable to the seller: that is both law and 
equity. Well, the gelding five years old is examined by A. B., 
and pronounced unsound — lame on the off hind leg, and spavined 
on the off hock. Here seems a clear case enough until the 
gelding is examined by B. C., who neither discovers spavin nor 
lameness behind, but pronounces him unsound from lameness in 
the near fore leg. Not content with these opinions — and who 
would be? — the gelding was again examined, and, with the excep- 
tion of a slight cold and slight thrushes, pronounced sound, with 
the addition of one year to the age, and the total subtraction of 
spavin and lameness. Now, if this case had gone into court, 
whose testimony must have been believed ? Upon what principles 
can we solve the mystery ? Which of the three certificates was 
right ? The last, from Mr. Goodwin’s account. Then it is clear 
that this reflection is cast upon A. B. and B. C., that they did not 
know a sound horse from a lame one, or a diseased animal from a 
healthy one. Does not this furnish some useful lessons of admo- 
nition ? Do we not feel more and more the importance of the 
subject; the necessity of laying down certain principles for our 
guidance, of steadily and earnestly using more discretion on a 
subject so mixed up with the well-being of our profession, and in 
a more and more enlarged sense cultivating veterinary jurispru- 
dence 1 
But let us once more return to our subject. On referring to my 
last paper, you will see that I endeavoured to explain what 1 
conceived to be the professional meaning (irrespective of legal or 
horse knowledge) of the words “ soundness ” and “ unsoundness.” 
I remarked, that, when we stated a horse was sound, we meant 
that he was free from sickness and disease; that he was right in 
his action and in the functions of the body ; that he was suitable 
for the purpose of the purchaser, true in his qualifications, and ca- 
pable of exertion ; and that unsoundness consisted in any deviation 
from these particulars : finally, I stated that in the examination of 
a horse, or in the delivery of an opinion as to his soundness, we 
had a threefold duty to perform; the first relating to ourselves,, the 
second to the purchaser, and lastly to the seller: and therefore it was 
