86 THE DESCENT OF MAN. PakT I- 
scale are guided almost exclusively, and those which 
stand higher in the scale are largely guided, in the aid 
which they give to the members of the same community,- 
by special instincts ; but they are likewise in part ini' 
polled by mutual love and sympathy, assisted app* 1 ' 
rently by some amount of reason. Although man, as just 
remarked, has no special instincts to tell him how to aid 
his fellow-men, he still has the impulse, and with his- 
improved intellectual faculties would naturally be much 
guided in this respect by reason and experience. In' 
stinctive sympathy would, also, cause him to value highly 
the approbation of his fellow-men ; for, as Mr. Bain has 
clearly shew n, 20 the love of praise and the strong feeling 
of glory, and the still stronger horror of scorn and in* 
lamy, “ are due to the workings of sympathy.” Conse- 
quently man would be greatly influenced by the wishes, 
approbation, and blame of his fellow-men, as expressed 
by their gestures and language. Thus the social in' 
stincts, which must have been acquired by man in * l 
very rude state, and probably even by his early ape-like 
progenitors, still give the impulse to many of his best 
actions ; but his actions are largely determined by the 
expressed wishes and judgment of his fellow-men, and 
unfortunately still oftener by bis own strong, selfish 
desires. But as the feelings of love and sympathy and 
the power of self-command become strengthened by 
habit, and as the power of reasoning becomes clearer so 
that man can appreciate the justice of the judgments of 
his fellow-men, he will feel himself impelled, independ- 
ently of any pleasure or pain felt at the moment, 1° 
certain lines of conduct. He may then say, I am the 
supreme judge of my own conduct, and in the words of 
Kant, 1 will not in my own person violate the dignity 
of humanity. 
20 * Mental and Moral Science,’ 1S6S, p. 251. 
