Chap. III. 
MORAL SENSE. 
87 
The more enduring Social Instincts conquer the less 
Persistent Instincts . — We have, however, not as yet con- 
sidered the main point, on which the whole question of 
the moral sense hinges. Why should a man feel that 
he ought to obey one instinctive desire rather than 
another? Why does he bitterly regret if he has yielded 
to the strong sense of self-preservation, and has not 
risked his life to save that of a fellow-creature ; or why 
does he regret having stolen food from severe hunger ? 
It is evident in the first place, that with mankind the 
instinctive impulses have different degrees ol strength , 
a young and timid mother urged by the maternal in- 
stinct will, without a moment’s hesitation, run the 
greatest danger for her infant, hut not lor a mere fel- 
low-creature. Many a man, or even boy, who never 
before risked his life for another, but in whom courage 
and sympathy were well developed, has, disregarding the 
instinct of self-preservation, instantaneously plunged 
into a torrent to save a drowning fellow-creature. In 
this case man is impelled by the same instinctive mo- 
tive, which caused the heroic little American monkey, 
formerly described, to attack the great and dreaded 
baboon, to save his keeper. Such actions as the above 
appear to be the simple result of the greater strength of 
the social or maternal instincts than of any other instinct 
or motive ; for they are performed too instantaneously 
for reflection, or for the sensation ot pleasure or pain , 
though if prevented distress would be caused, 
I am aware that some persons maintain that actions 
performed impulsively, as in the above cases, do not 
come under the dominion of the moral sense, and 
cannot be called moral. They confine this term to 
actions done deliberately, after a victory over opposing 
desires, or to actions prompted by some lofty motive. 
But it appears scarcely possible to draw any clear line 
