88 
THE DESCENT OF MAN. 
Taut I. 
ol distinction of this kind ; though the distinction may 
be real. As far as exalted motives are concerned, many 
instances have been recorded of barbarians, destitute of 
any feeling of general benevolence towards mankind, 
and not guided by any religious motive, who have deli- 
berately as prisoners sacrificed their lives,- 1 rather than 
betray their comrades ; and surely their conduct ought 
to be considered as moral. As far as deliberation and 
the victory over opposing motives are concerned, ani- 
mals may be seen doubting between opposed instincts, 
as in rescuing their offspring or comrades from dan- 
ger; yet their actions, though done for the good of 
others, are not called moral. Moreover, an action 
repeatedly performed by us, will at last be done with- 
out deliberation or hesitation, and can then hardly be 
distinguished from an instinct; yet surely no one will 
pretend that an action thus done ceases to be moral. 
On the contrary, we all feel that an act cannot be 
considered as perfect, or as performed in the most 
noble manner, uuless it be done impulsively, without 
deliberation or effort, in the same manner as by a man 
in whom the requisite qualities are innate. He 
who is forced to overcome his fear or want of sym- 
pathy before he acts, deserves, however, in one way 
highei credit than the man whose innate disposition 
leads him to a good act without effort. As we cannot 
distinguish between motives, we rank all actions of a 
certain class as moral, when they are performed by 
a moral being. A moral being is one who is capable of 
comparing his past and future actions or motives, and 
of approving or disapproving of them. We have no 
reason to suppose that any of the lower animals have 
21 I have given one such case, namely of three Patagonian Indians 
who preferred being shot, one after the other, to betraying the plans of 
their companions m war (‘ Journal of Researches,* 1845, p. 103). 
