Chap. III. 
MORAL SENSE. 
97 
tribe. This conclusion agrees well with the belief that 
the so-called moral sense is aboriginally derived from 
the social instincts, for both relate at first exclusively to 
tile community. The chief causes of the low morality 
of savages, as judged by our standard, are, firstly, the 
confinement of sympathy to the same tribe. Secondly, 
insufficient powers of reasoning, so that the bearing ot 
many virtues, especially of the self-regarding virtues, on 
the general welfare of the tribe is not recognised. 
Savages, for instance, fail to trace the multiplied evils 
consequent on a want of temperance, chastity, &c. 
And. thirdly, weak power of self-command; lor this 
power has not been strengthened through long-con- 
tinued, perhaps inherited, habit, instruction and religion. 
I have entered into the above details on the immor- 
ality of savages , 30 because some authors have recently 
taken a high view of their moral nature, or have attri- 
buted most of their crimes to mistaken benevolence . 31 
These authors appear to rest their conclusion on savages 
possessing, as they undoubtedly do possess, and often 
in a high degree, those virtues which are serviceable, 
°r even necessary, for the existence of a tribal com- 
munity. 
Concluding Remarks . — Philosophers of the derivative 1 
school of morals formerly assumed that the foundation 
°f morality lay in a form of Selfishness ; but more 
recently in the “ Greatest Happiness principle. Ac- 
cording to the view given above, the moial sense is 
30 See on this subject copious evidence in Chap. vii. of Sir J. 
Fubboclr, ‘Origin of Civilisation/ 1870. 
31 For instance Lccky, 1 Hist. European Morals/ vol. i. p. 124. 
32 This term is used in an able article in the ‘ Westminister Review,' 
Oct. 1869, p. 498. For the Greatest Happiness principle, see J. S. 
Mill, 1 TJt'iitarianism/ p. 17. 
VOL. I. 
H 
