392 
GENERAL SUMMARY 
Part II. 
some and disapproving of others; and the fact that 
man is the one being who with certainty can be thus 
designated makes the greatest of all distinctions be- 
tween him and the lower animals. But in our third 
chapter I have endeavoured to shew that the moral 
sense follows, firstly, from the enduring and always 
present nature of the social instincts, in which respect 
man agrees with the lower animals ; secondly, from his 
appreciation of the approbation and disapprobation of 
his fellows, and thirdly, from his mental faculties being 
h % hl y active and his impressions of past events ex- 
tiemely vivid, in which respects he differs from the 
lower animals. Owing to this condition of mind, man 
cannot avoid looking both backwards and forwards, 
and comparing past impressions. Hence after some 
temporary desire or passion has mastered his social in- 
stincts, ho will reflect and compare the now weakened 
impression of such past impulses, with the ever present 
social instincts ; and he will then feel that sense of dis- 
satisfaction which all unsatisfied instincts leave behind 
them. Consequently he resolves to act differently for 
the future — and this is conscience. Any instinct which 
is permanently stronger or more enduring than another, 
gives rise to a feeling which we express by saving that 
it ought to be obeyed. A pointer dog, if able to reflect 
on his past conduct, would say to himself, I ought (as 
indeed we say of him) to have pointed at that hare 
and not have yielded to the passing temptation of 
springing on and hunting it. 
bocial animals are partly impelled by a wish to aid 
the members of the same community in a general 
manner, but more commonly to perform certain definite 
actions. Man is impelled by the same general wish to 
aid his fellows, but has few or no special instincts. 
He differs also from the lower animals in being able 
